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Abstract 
Risk, Treatment Amenability, and the Nature of Weapon:   
Influences on Juvenile Judges’ Transfer Decisions 
Sarita T. Lyons 
Kirk Heilbrun, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
Judicial transfers are a longstanding, integral aspect of the juvenile justice system.  There 
are several factors set forth in Kent v. United States (1966) that judges should consider 
when making a decision to transfer a juvenile to criminal court.  Little research has 
investigated what influences have the greatest influence on judicial transfer decision. This 
study, however  empirically examined, whether juvenile court judges report hypothetical, 
vignette-based transfer decisions influenced by reoffense risk and treatment amenability 
(two Kent factors) and type of weapon allegedly used in the offense (a non-Kent 
influence).   This survey vignette used a 2 x 2 x 2 between subjects design.  Currently, 
there are only 14 states that use judicial discretion as the sole means of transferring a 
juvenile to adult court.  However, for this study, judges were surveyed from all 50 states 
to evaluate what factor(s) most influence their transfer decisions, despite the current 
transfer mechanism(s) in place in their state.  The survey design systematically 
manipulated Violence Risk (high/low), Treatment Amenability (high/low), and (c) Nature 
of Weapon (gun/knife).  It was hypothesized that there would be a significant difference 
in the likelihood that a responding judge would transfer a juvenile to adult court if (a) that 
juvenile is at high risk for future offending, (b) has treatment needs and amenability that 
  JUVENILE TRANSFER xiii 
 
are not appropriate for the juvenile justice system, and (c) was allegedly in possession of 
or used a gun in the commission of a crime.  The researchers asked judges (N=305) from 
the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges to examine one of eight 
hypothetical vignettes.  Results showed that risk and weapon type had a significant 
influence on the judge’s likelihood to transfer the juvenile, whereas amenability to 
treatment did not.  Additionally, results showed a significant interaction for risk and 
amenability.  Policy implications for this important area of law and psychology are 
fourfold: (a) The underuse of forensic evaluations in transfer decisions, (b) the apparent 
insignificant value placed on amenability to treatment and transfer decisions, (c) the 
importance of creating national standards for transfer decisions, (d) the need for 
improvements in delinquency prevention and weapon reduction interventions. 
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Introduction 
 
 
All states have some means of transferring juveniles to adult court, although the mechanisms that 
initiate such transfers vary by state (Feld, 2000; Snyder & Sickmund, 1995).  Perceptions of a 
juvenile crime epidemic in the mid-1980’s to early 1990’s, when youth violence peaked, fueled 
public scrutiny of the juvenile justice system’s ability to effectively manage violent offenders.  
This resulted in states adopting legislative changes that would ―get tough‖ on juvenile crime, 
thereby making it easier to transfer youths to adult courts (Brannen et al, 2006; Grisso, 1996); 
Snyder & Sickmund, 2003, Schwartz, 1989). 
 Clear guidelines to facilitate juvenile transfers have not always been in place (Tanehaus, 
2000, Witt, 2003).  Following the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Kent v. United States (1966), 
there are specific criteria that should be considered before transferring a juvenile to adult 
criminal courts.  The Kent case outlined eight specific factors
1
, three of which would have the 
                                                          
1
The Kent Criteria, which would be inscribed into state’s laws, came from a policy memorandum prepared in 1959 
by the chief judge of the District of Columbia’s juvenile court.  It read: 
(1)  The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection of the community 
requires waiver.  (2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or 
willful manner.  (3) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight being 
given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted.  (4)  The protective merit of the 
complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment 
(to be determined by consultation with the United States Attorney).  (5) The desirability of trial and disposition 
of the entire offense in one court when the juvenile’s associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be 
charged with a crime in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.  (6)  The sophistication and maturity 
of the Juvenile as determined by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and 
pattern of living.  (7)  The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts with the 
Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of 
probation to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile institutions.  (8)  The prospects for adequate 
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greatest influence on future transfer decisions: 1) potential risk to the community, b) 
sophistication-maturity, and c) amenability to treatment (Brannen, 2006; Ewing, 1990; Kruh & 
Brodsky, 1997; Salekin, 2002). One problem with the process of juvenile transfer decisions 
involves the lack of standardization of rules governing their decisions (D’Angelo, 2007).  Given 
the allowance for judicial discretion afforded by the parens patriae
2
 philosophy of the juvenile 
justice system, it is not surprising that research focusing on both legal and extra-legal factors in 
decision-making cannot readily account for the differences in how judges decide transfers 
(Johnson & Secret, 1995).  Although there is research that indicates that juvenile court judges 
rely on both legal and extra-legal factors when making decisions (Andrews, & Leschied; 
Campbell & Schmidt, 2000; Cohen & Kluegel, 1978; Hoge, 1995; Kueneman & Linden, 1983; 
Kueneman, Linden & Kosmick, 1992; Niarhos & Routh, 1992; Thomas & Cage, 1997), there is 
very little evidence exploring what factors have the greatest influence on the likelihood that a 
judge will decide to transfer a juvenile to criminal court.    
                                                                                                                                                                                           
protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have 
committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the 
Juvenile Court (Kent, 1966, p. 565-66). 
 
 
2
 Medieval English doctrine of parens patriae (literally translated “the father of the country”) was used by the 
creators of the juvenile court to argue that benevolent state treatment of children was in their best interest.  The 
juvenile court said they would act as a chancery court, not a criminal court, and seek to rehabilitate, not punish, 
children (Tanehaus, 2000). 
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 The present study empirically investigated the influences of two factors from Kent, and 
one non-statutory factor related to public safety, the likelihood that a judge will transfer a 
juvenile from the juvenile system to the criminal (adult) system. 
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Literature Review 
 
History of Juvenile Courts 
 
 
Early in the history of the United States, children who violated the law were treated as 
adult criminals (Hamparian et al., 1982; Schetky, 2003; Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  During the 
late 18
th
 century, ―infants‖ below the age of reason (age seven) were thought to be incapable of 
criminal intent and were exempt from prosecution and criminal punishment (Addams, 1925; 
Mack, 1909; Platt, 1977, Snyder & Sickmund, 2006; Tanenhaus, 2000).  However, children as 
young as seven could stand trial in criminal court for crimes committed; if convicted, they were 
also eligible to receive a prison sentence or even a death sentence (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006; 
Streib, 1983).  Using the model of the 16
th
 century European educational reform movements, the 
United States in the 19
th
 century began a movement which eventually lead to the establishment 
of the juvenile court (Abbott, 1925; Lou, 1927; Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  The emergence of 
the juvenile court was influenced by the earlier reform movements that changed the perception of 
children from being ―little adults‖ to that of individuals still developing moral and cognitive 
capacities (Ainsworth, 1991; Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  Steinberg (2001) raised concerns 
about trying juveniles as adults based on developmental research arguing most children will not 
prove to be sufficiently blameworthy to warrant exposure to the harsh consequences of a 
criminal court, therefore, individuals 12 and under should continue to be viewed as juveniles, 
regardless of the nature of their offense.  This change in thinking was the basis for establishing 
the juvenile court on the premise that children were inherently different from adults, and that it 
  JUVENILE TRANSFER 5 
 
was the state’s charge to protect and rehabilitate youthful offenders (Poulos & Orchowsky, 1994; 
Shook, 2005, Steinberg, 2001).  In essence, juvenile court was created as a social welfare 
institution whose main goal was to act in the best interest of the child, especially poor children of 
immigrants living in congested urban areas (Grossberg, 1996; Pisciotta, 1982; Rendleman, 1971; 
Tanenhaus, 2000).  Altruistic as that goal may have been, the creation of a court whose mission 
was to deliver social services to needy children ―situated the juvenile court on a number of 
cultural and criminological fault-lines‖ (Feld, 1997, p. 72).  On one side of the fault line was the 
juvenile court with a  benevolent theme of rehabilitation and informal procedures; on the other 
side stood the criminal justice system ―with its traditional emphasis on punishment, adversarial 
practices, and procedural safeguards‖  (Tanenhaus, 2000, p. 14).  This system of justice was 
generally stable until after World War II, when legal critics and a series of U.S. Supreme Court 
cases began to shake the conceptual foundations of the juvenile justice system (Allen, 1964; 
Manfredi, 1998; Rosenheim, 1962; Tappan, 1949; Tanenhaus, 2000).      
The first juvenile court in the United States was created in 1899 in Cook County, Illinois 
by policy makers, practitioners, and activists who believed that the causes of youth crime were 
unmistakably different from the causes of adult crime (Harris, 2007; Witt, 2003).   Advocates of 
a separate juvenile system believed that juveniles committed crime as a result of their inadequate 
environments, and that juveniles would be more receptive to treatment than would adults (Fagan, 
Frost & Vivona, 19878; Harris, 2007).  An important goal of the new juvenile court involved 
assessing and treating young ―deviants‖ through rehabilitation, as contrasted with the more 
punishment-oriented approach applied to adults in criminal court (Grisso, 1996; Harris, 2007; 
Poulos & Orchowsky, 1994).  Juvenile courts flourished for the first half of the 20
th
 century.  By 
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1910, 32 states had juvenile courts; by 1925, all but two states had established juvenile courts 
and/or probation services (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  The laws that established the juvenile 
court clearly reflected the court’s mission, which led to procedural and substantive differences 
between the juvenile and criminal justice systems (Dawson, 2000; Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  
Jurisdiction was extended by the creation of ―status offenses,‖ (truancy, possession and 
consumption of alcohol, incorrigibility, curfew violations, and purchase of cigarettes) which 
applied only to children and youth, justified as a part of the court’s role in helping ―wayward‖ 
youth and protecting them from corruption influences (Shook, 2005).  Procedurally, the juvenile 
court was characterized by informal, non-adversarial procedures; the omission of lawyers and 
due process, technical aspects of the adult criminal court, were thought to hinder the court’s 
ability to get to know the youth, and deliver effective interventions (Grisso, 1998; Shook, 2005).  
Unlike the criminal justice system, the juvenile court also controlled its own intake, considered 
extra-legal factors in deciding how to handle a case, and had a range of dispositional options 
regardless of offense (Melton et al., 1997; Snyder & Sickmund, 2006; Witt, 2003).  Disposition 
outcomes, tailored to ―the best interest of the child,‖ ranged from warnings, and probation 
supervision, to training school confinement, with treatment lasting until the child was ―cured‖ or 
became an adult (age 21) -whichever came first (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).   
In the 1950’s and 1960’s, many began to question the underlying rehabilitative 
philosophy of the juvenile court (Witt, 2003).  Rehabilitation through individualized justice was 
not disputed, but there was growing concern for the number of juveniles institutionalized 
indefinitely in the name of treatment (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).          
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During the Progressive Era (1880-1930), Chicago juvenile court judges were concerned 
that the Illinois Supreme Court would deem the pioneering juvenile law unconstitutional.  As a 
result, many juvenile court judges did not assert the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to 
them by a 1905 revision of the state’s juvenile law 3 (Tanenhaus, 2000).  These officials allowed 
an informal system of concurrent jurisdiction to be created by not challenging prosecutor’s 
decisions to charge the juvenile offenders as adults (Hart, 1910; Sargent & Gordon, 1963; Feld, 
1978; Tanehaus, 2000).  Judges who did not attempt to keep these children in the juvenile justice 
system were engaging in a form of ―passive transfer‖ (Jeter, 1922, p. 15).  
But there were continued efforts to make judicial waiver a more viable tool of the 
juvenile court.  The National Probation Association in June 1925 rejected the recommendation 
from the committee to end transfers, and instead created a section entitled ―waiver of 
jurisdiction‖ (Lou, 1927, p. 237).  This section gave a judge the power to transfer a child over 16 
years of age who was charged with a felony, but only ―after a full  investigation‖ had convinced 
the judge that transfer was ―for the best interest of the child and the state‖ ( Lou [1927] 1972, pp. 
237-38).  The act did not specify what constituted a ―full investigation,‖ but did imply that some 
                                                          
3
 Section 1 of the 1905 Revised Juvenile Act defined which children fell under the court’s jurisdiction.  The 
definition was extremely broad: 
 The words delinquent child shall include any male child under the age of seventeen years or any female 
child under the age of eighteen years who violates any law of this State or any city or village ordinance; or who is 
incorrigible; or who knowingly associates with thieves, vicious or immoral persons; or, who, without just cause and 
without the consent of its parents or custodian, absents itself from its home or place of abode, or who is growing 
up in  idleness or crime; or who knowingly frequents a house of ill-repute; or who knowingly frequents any policy 
shop or place where gaming device is operated; or who frequents any saloon or dram shop where intoxicating 
liquors are sold; …. Any child committing any of the acts herein mentioned shall be deemed a delinquent child and 
shall be proceeded against as such in the manner hereinafter provided.  (Laws of the state of Illinois 1905, 153)  
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procedural integrity was indicated, given the gravity of the decision (Ryerson, 1978; Tanehaus, 
2000; Waite, 1921).   
In the early 1960’s, efforts to reevaluate the juvenile justice systems continued.  A study 
published by the Advisory Council of Judges of the National Council on Crime and 
Delinquency, (Transfer of Cases, 1962)
4
 criticized the nation’s juvenile courts for failing to base 
transfer decisions on the best interest of the child (Gilbert, 1986; Tanehaus, 2000).  The council 
conducted a survey to determine how effectively courts used such transfer.  It then used the 
results to create policy statements regarding how the transfer procedure should be used (Transfer 
of Cases 1962, 3).  The council showed that most judges strongly supported having exclusive 
original jurisdiction for juvenile courts in children’s, as well as the initiation and control of the 
transfer procedure, but that they rarely used this option (Tanehaus, 2000).  One significant 
problem was that four of the five major factors cited by the judges in making transfer decisions 
were in conflict with the philosophy of the juvenile court (Tanehaus, 2000).  It appeared that the 
judges transferred cases  
because ―issues of contestable facts‖ indicate that the hearing in the juvenile 
court will be  prolonged; ―the offense, occurring after correctional treatment 
for a previous offense, is serious‖; ―the case is hopeless‖; or ―the child needs 
to be punished for his attitude.‖  The only acceptable criterion used, according  
to the advisory council, was transferring a child because of ―the advantage in  
resources for treatment and public safety lies with the criminal court rather  
                                                          
4
 The following year Sargent and Gordon (1963) called for the elimination of waiver because the practice 
represented the abandonment of children in need of help. 
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than the juvenile court (Transfer of Cases, 1962, p. 5).   
 
The Council, by contrasts recommended that juvenile court judges consider the following when 
making transfer decisions: 
 (1) the prior record and character of the minor, his physical and mental 
 maturity, and his pattern of living; (2) the type of offense- whether it  
demonstrated viciousness or involved force or violence; and (3) the  
comparable adequacy and suitability of facilities available to the juvenile 
 and criminal courts. (Transfer of Cases, 1962, p. 7). 
 
By the early 1960’s, with this Council recommendation, juvenile court judges had at minimum a 
policy statement and expanding literature on the issue of transfer.  In addition to expanding 
literature and policy statements regarding transfers, juvenile court judges could also look to 
recent federal district court decisions that collectively defined waiver (Feld, 1993; Ludwig, 1955; 
Manfredi, 1998; Rothman, 1980; Tanehaus, 2000; Tappan, 1949; Sobie, 1987).  The circuit court 
initially equated transfer hearings with hearing to determine probable cause (Green v. United 
States, 1962).  Next, a circuit court held that transfer was ―a judicial determination that the child 
is beyond the rehabilitative philosophy‖ of the juvenile court (Watkins v. United States, 1965). 
Finally, in Black v. United States, (1965), the circuit court held that transfer was a ―critically 
important‖ decision in the life of a juvenile.  The transfer decisions would then determine 
whether children ―would cross the fault lines separating the juvenile court from the world of 
criminal justice‖ (Tanehaus, 2000 p. 32).   
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Several landmark cases in the 20
th
 century gave new rights to juveniles in criminal 
proceedings, drastically altering the landscape of the juvenile court.  Kent v. United States (1966) 
was the first of three decisions that challenged the foundations of the juvenile court.  In Kent, 
(1966) the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process protections were warranted in juvenile 
court proceedings that could lead to the juvenile’s transfer from a juvenile court to an adult 
criminal court (Witt, 2003).   The Court in Kent raised a potential constitutional challenge to 
parens patriae and rehabilitation as the foundations of the juvenile court (Allen, 1981; Beckett, 
1997; Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  In the past, the Court had interpreted the 14
th
 amendment to 
mean that certain classes of people could receive less due process if a ―compensating benefit‖ 
came with this lesser protection (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  For instance, McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania (1971), the Court held that juveniles were not entitled to a trial by jury, arguing 
that the juvenile court proceeding was not the fully adversarial process found in criminal courts. 
Some critics of the juvenile court argue that, given the punitive changes in juvenile justice 
legislation since the 1971 decision, the only remaining procedural differences between juvenile 
and adult criminal courts are access to juries and access to counsel (Feld, 1993).  In theory, the 
pre-Kent juvenile court was providing less due process but greater concern for the interests of the 
juvenile.  However, the Court in Kent emphasized that this compensating benefit may not exist in 
reality (Witt, 2003).   Justice Fortas, writing for the majority stated, ―There is evidence…that 
there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets 
neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment 
postulated for children‖ (Kent, 1966, p. 566).  The significance of Kent is threefold: 
First, the justices, by attaching an appendix of ―determinative factor‖  
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to be considered in potential transfer cases, provided broad new guidelines 
that the majority of state legislatures incorporated into their own juvenile  
laws (Feld 1987, 505-7).  The adoption of the Kent criteria provided at  
least the appearance of uniformity in American juvenile justice, but also  
had the unintended consequence of insulating transfer decisions from  
appellate review on due process grounds because of the subjective nature  
of the standards (Feld 1987, 491-92).  Second, the endorsement in Kent 
 of the concept of judicial waiver and attempt to fuse the goals of paternalism  
and prodedural fairness in the juvenile court occurred at a volatile moment 
 in American history.  Calls for ―law and order‖ from the right and for the 
 end of―social control‖ from the left were eroding the rehabilitative ideal… 
Thus Kent marked the beginning of the end of an era characterized by the 
 incorporation of procedural safeguards into parens patriae. Finally, Kent 
 focused attention on intercourt transfer and encouraged criminologists 
 to study how these decisions were made, which children were transferred, 
 and what the consequences for them were, (Tanehaus, 2000, p.  32-33). 
 
Shortly after the Kent decision, In re Gault (1967) was decided by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  It involved a juvenile’s capacity to waive Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 1965).  
Gault held that because juvenile courts give sanctions, even if under the mission of 
rehabilitation, juveniles should have procedural and due process protections similar to adults 
(Witt, 2003).  The third landmark case that gave juveniles more rights was In re Winship (1970) 
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were the central issue in the case was whether ―proof beyond a reasonable doubt‖ should be 
considered among the ―essentials of due process and fair treatment‖ required during the 
adjudicatory stage of the juvenile court process (Snyder and Sickmund, 2006).  The Court 
rejected the lower court position that juvenile courts were not required to operate on the same 
standards as adult courts because juvenile courts were designed to ―save‖ rather than to ―punish‖ 
children, thereby ruling that the ―reasonable doubt‖ standard should be required in all 
delinquency adjudications (In re Winship, 1970).      
  Beginning in the mid-1960’s, there was an increase in adolescent crime that continued 
into the late 1970’s, which provided strong political pressure for get-tough criminal sentencing 
and waiver policies (Feld, 2000).  Juvenile waiver policies began to shift in the early 70’s ―from 
rehabilitation to retribution, from offender to offense, from amenability to public safety and from 
judicial to the legislative or executive branches,‖ (Feld, 2000, p. 108).  By the 1980’s, the public 
perceived that juvenile crime was rising and that the juvenile system was too lenient to 
effectively deal with juvenile violence, (Redding, R. E., Howell, J.C., 2000; Snyder & 
Sickmund, 2006).   Starting in the mid-1980s and extending to the mid-1990s, there was a ―wave 
of youth violence‖ that led to increased juvenile transfers (Fried & Repucci, 2001; Grisso, 1996, 
1998; Woolard, Fondacaro, & Slobogin, 2001).   As juveniles came to be feared as perpetrators 
of the most serious and violent crimes, the principles of rehabilitation that were the foundation of 
the juvenile court were largely abandoned (Fagan, 2008; Grisso, 1996; Woolard et al., 2001).  
Many states responded by passing more punitive laws, including mandatory sentences and 
automatic transfers to adult court for certain crimes (Schetky, 2003).  The ―get tough‖ stance that 
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the public was demanding to manage juvenile violence led to greater emphasis on crime control 
models and opened the door for automatic and prosecutorial transfer legislation (Brannen, et al, 
2006).   
 
 
Transfer 
 
 Defining Transfer 
Since the inception of the juvenile court over a century ago, juvenile court judges have 
had the power to waive their jurisdiction over a juvenile offender and transfer juvenile cases to 
criminal court.  Juvenile transfer to adult court is the process by which children and adolescents 
can be removed from the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system and placed in the jurisdiction 
of the adult criminal system (Salekin et al., 2002).   Transfer is also called ―waiver‖ or 
―bindover‖ in some jurisdictions.   Juveniles not transferred to the adult court are often said to be 
―retained‖ in the juvenile system (McGowan et al., 2007).  After fulfilling constitutional 
requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard, a juvenile court judge must decide if there is 
probable cause to conclude that an alleged juvenile offender has committed a serious offense 
and, if so, whether it is in the best interest of the community to transfer the case to criminal court 
(Dawson, 2000).   
Transferring children from juvenile court to criminal court is a serious decision.  A 
transfer can have ―tremendous consequences for the juvenile‖ (Kent v. United States, 1966, p. 
554), including lengthy incarceration, loss of right to vote or serve in the military, exposure to 
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the conditions of adult prison, increase in the risks for suicide and recidivism, respectively, and 
(previously) execution for capital offenses
5
 (Bishop et al, 1998, Frost, Fagan, & Vivona, 1989; 
Klein, 1998; Redding, 2003).  Some view transfers as the most serious decisions a juvenile court 
can make: ―Waiver to the adult court is the single most serious act the juvenile court can 
perform…because once waiver of jurisdiction occurs, the child loses all protective and 
rehabilitative possibilities available‖ (State v. R.G.D., 1987, p. 835).  One rationale for transfer to 
criminal court is deterrence from further offending because the criminal justice system is 
perceived as more punitive than the juvenile system (McGowan et al., 2007).  Ironically, despite 
the ―get tough‖ reflected in juvenile transfer, studies show that rates of juvenile offending are not 
lower in states where it is relatively more common to try adolescents as adults; likewise, 
juveniles who have been tried as adults are no less likely to reoffend than their counterparts who 
have been tried as juveniles (Fagan, 2008; Howell, 1996; Podkopacz & Feld, 1996).  Research 
on transfer and recidivism suggests that, for juveniles with similar individual characteristics and 
correctional experiences, recidivism rates are either the same or significantly higher for 
transferred you as opposed to youth who remain in the juvenile court (Fagan, 2008).  
Additionally Fagan (2008) notes that studies reveal that transferring juveniles to criminal court 
worsens criminal behavior and increases public safety risks.  Although the legal term ―juvenile‖ 
is defined differently among the states (McGowan et al., 2007), for the purpose of this 
dissertation, a juvenile will be defined as a person younger than 18 years.  
                                                          
5
 Juvenile executions are no longer carried out in the United States.  In a 5 to 4 decision, The U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices ruled in favor of ending the execution of juvenile offenders in Roper v. Simmons (2005). 
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State Transfer Trends 
Juvenile transfers were once limited to only a few jurisdictions.  Currently, however, all 
states allow transfer under some circumstances.  Following the increase in violent juvenile crime 
in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, most states modified their laws to facilitate the transfer of 
juveniles to the adult system (Brannen et al., 2006; McGowen, et al., 2007).  Between 1992 and 
1998, all but three states expanded their transfer laws to permit the prosecution of juveniles 
charged with certain crimes in the adult criminal system (Bishop, 2000; Torbert & Szymanski, 
1998).  This trend has continued but slowed in recent years (Griffin et al., 2003).  Bishop (2000) 
estimates that 20%-25% of all juvenile offenders (210,000-260,000 juveniles) were prosecuted 
as adults via prosecutorial discretion in 1996 (McGowen, et al., 2007).  In 2005, U.S. courts with 
juvenile jurisdiction handled 1.7 million delinquency cases, more than half of those cases (56%) 
were handled formally, with a petition filed (prosecutorial discretion) requesting an adjudication 
or waiver hearing (Adams & Addi, 2009).  Of the petitioned juvenile cases, fewer than 1% 
resulted in a judicial transfer (Adams & Addi, 2009).  The number of judicially waived 
transferred cases peaked in 1994 at 13,000, as 80% increase over the number of cases waived in 
1985 (7,200) (Bishop & Frazier, 2000; Adams, & Addi, 2009).  However, after the 1994 peak, 
from 1995-2004, the number of juvenile cases judicially waived declined to 6,900 cases reported 
in 2005 (Bishop & Friazier, 2000; Adams, & Addi, 2009).  Decreases in violent crime by 
juveniles explains much of this decline; however, part of the decline in judicial waivers is due to 
the widespread expansion of non-judicial transfer laws (Adams & Addi, 2009; Snyder & 
Sickmund, 2006).  Many cases that would have been subject to judicial waiver proceedings have 
been filed directly in criminal court, bypassing the juvenile court all together (Griffin, Torbet, & 
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Szymanski, 1998; Adams & Addi, 2009).  Newer emphasis on crime control paved the way for 
statutory and prosecutorial transfer legislation designed at getting violent youth off the streets 
quickly (Brannen, 2006; Brown & Langan, 1998; Defrances & Steadman, 1998).  Particulars 
included reducing the minimum age for transfer, expanding the number of offenses for which 
youth could be transferred, and easing the process of transfer by eliminating some criteria that 
had previously been considered before waiving juveniles to adult court (Grisso & Schwartz, 
2000; Heilbrun et al., 2006).    
 
Transfer Mechanisms 
 
Every jurisdiction uses one or a combination of statutory approaches to prosecute some 
juveniles as adults (Frost Clausel & Bonnie, 2000; Griffin, et al., 1998) (See Table 1).  After 
Kent (1966) juvenile transfers are found throughout the United States.  Juveniles may be 
transferred in one of three ways.  Although the technical and administrative details of transfer 
legislation vary in each jurisdiction, (1) judicial waiver, (2) statutory exclusion, and (3) 
prosecutorial discretion represent the three generic approaches used to identify which serious 
young offenders should be prosecuted as adults (Feld, 1987; Feld, 2000; Fritsch & Hemmens, 
1995; Snyder, & Sickmund, 1995; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1995).  These three 
approaches reflect the different ways of addressing questions regarding the identification and 
handling of serious offenders (Feld, 2000).  Most states (46) and the District of Columbia use 
judicial discretion or judicial waiver; 28 states use statutory exclusion or excluded offenses, and 
15 states use prosecutorial discretion or direct file statutes (D’Angelo, 2007; Puzzanhera, 2003; 
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Snyder & Sickmund, 1999).  In some cases, a juvenile can be considered for ―decertification‖ or 
―transfer back‖ from criminal court to juvenile court if the charge originates in criminal court 
through either statutory exclusion or prosecutorial discretion (Heilbrun et al., 1997).   
Judicial Waiver 
 
Judicial waiver/transfer was the historical means of transferring a juvenile to adult court 
(Dawson, 2000; Witt, 2003).  Judges would hold a transfer hearing based on a prosecutorial 
motion, but had discretion to either retain jurisdiction or transfer the juvenile to adult court (Witt, 
2003).  This type of waiver is typically called discretionary judicial waiver.  There are three 
broad categories for judicial waiver: (1) discretionary, (2) presumptive, and (3) mandatory.  
Some fifteen states have presumptive waiver laws, which specify a category of cases in which 
waiver to criminal court is presumed to be appropriate; therefore, the juvenile has the burden to 
make an adequate argument against transfer (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention, 2009).  Other states (15) provide for mandatory waiver in cases that meet certain age, 
offense, or prior record criteria (Adams & Addie, 2009).  Court proceeding against juveniles 
subject to mandatory waiver are initiated in juvenile court, but the court’s only role is to 
determine whether the statutory requirements for mandatory waiver are met; if so, the cases must 
be sent to criminal court (Adams & Addie, 2009; Dawson, 2000; Torbet & Szymanski, 1998).  
Prior to the mid- 1960’s, judges’ discretion was virtually unchecked, with no standards on what 
criteria constituted valid grounds for a transfer (Witt, 2003).   
Historically, Kent (1966) has had a significant impact on the way in which juveniles 
should be considered for transfer (Brannen et al., 2006, Feld, 2000; Tanenhaus, 2000).  The case 
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outlined specific factors to be considered in a judicial decision for transfer: (a) potential risk to 
the community; (b) maturity or sophistication of character, and (c) amenability to intervention 
(Brennan et al., 2006, Ewing, 1990, Salekin, 2002).  Most states authorizing juvenile courts to 
make discretionary waivers have broad standards or factors to be applied when deciding to waive 
jurisdiction.  Most standards paraphrase or are loosely based on the original Kent criteria, 
although there are other states who add factors of their own to the Kent list (Griffin et al, 1998).
6
   
Overall, a juvenile court judge may waive jurisdiction on a ―discretionary basis‖ after a hearing 
is conducted to determine if a juvenile is ―amenable to treatment‖ or represents a ―threat to 
public safety‖ (Dawson, 2000; Feld, 2000).      
Prosecutorial Discretion 
 
  Prosecutorial discretion is the second type of transfer mechanism that defines a class of 
cases in which the prosecutor may decide whether to prosecute the case initially in juvenile or 
criminal court (Biship & Frazier, 1991; Feld, 2000; McCarthy, 1994; Snyder & Sickmund, 
2006).  These provisions afford both the juvenile and adult criminal courts the power to hear 
cases involving certain offenses or age/offense categories, but the ultimate decision about where 
to file the charges is left up to the prosecutor (Griffin et al., 1998).  As with judicial waiver, there 
is a wide variation among states regarding criteria for prosecutorial discretion, with some states 
                                                          
6
 In the District of Columbia judges considering waiver are asked to bear in mind, in addition to the Kent factors, 
the “potential rehabilitative effect…of parenting classes or family counseling” on the juvenile.  Arizona adds 
consideration of the views of the victim and any gang involvement on the juvenile’s part to the usual list of factors.  
Maine requires the court to ask whether retaining jurisdiction would “diminish the gravity of the offense” in public 
opinion.  The Missouri courts must take into account any “racial disparity in certification” of juveniles for adult 
prosecution (Griffin et al., 1998). 
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emphasizing offense categories, others the age of the juvenile, and others the extent or 
seriousness of the juvenile’s offending history (Feld, 2000; Griffin et al., 1998; Thomas & 
Bilchik, 1985).   
Statutory Exclusion 
 
Statutory exclusion accounts for the largest number of transfers (Snyder & Sickmund, 
2006).  Statutory exclusion is another transfer mechanism which state statutes remove specific 
offenses or age/offense/prior record category cases from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction (Griffin, 
1998).  Statutory exclusion frequently supplements judicial waiver provisions, and this approach 
emphasizes the ―seriousness of the offense and reflects the retributive values of the criminal law‖ 
(Feld, 2000, p.  84-85).  The laws of states using statutory exclusion as a means of transfer 
simply ―exclude‖ anyone from being defined as a ―child‖ and render them ineligible for 
consideration for any juvenile court purpose.    A juvenile accused of an ―excluded offense‖ is 
treated as an adult from the beginning, processed (by information, indictment, or otherwise) in 
the criminal court that would have had jurisdiction over the same offense if it had been 
committed by an adult (Grifin, 1998; Klein, 1998; Zimring, 1981).  This is not the same as 
prosecutorial discretion, which is merely an option available to the prosecutor.  Once a 
prosecutor has made a decision to charge a juvenile with an excluded offense, the charge must be 
filed in criminal court (Griffin et al., 1998).  Because legislatures create juvenile courts, they 
ultimately can define the jurisdiction to exclude youth from juvenile court based on age and 
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offense (Feld, 2000).
7
  What has been considered ―legislative line drawing‖ that sets the 
maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction below the general eighteen-year-old age of majority, 
results in the adult criminal prosecution of the largest number of juveniles (U.S. General 
Accounting Office, 1995).  This type of line drawing resulted in the criminal prosecution of 
176,000 juveniles below the age of eighteen in 1991 (Feld, 2000).  
Recent estimates of the percentages of juvenile’s transferred to criminal court under each 
type of transfer mechanism indicate that despite the creation of newer avenues to facilitate 
juvenile transfers, the traditional judicial transfer remains the most common approach used with 
46 states and the District of Columbia using judicial discretion to transfer a juvenile to criminal 
court (Brannen et al., 2006; D’Angelo, 2007; Dawson, 2000; Snyder & Sickmund, 1999).  The 
General Accounting Office once estimated that judicial waivers accounted for a higher 
percentage of juveniles arriving in criminal court than direct filings or statutory exclusions (U.S. 
General Accounting Office, 1995).  However, a 2006 report on juvenile offenders estimates that 
statutory exclusion, while only available in 28 states, may now account for more youth under the 
age of 18 being tried in criminal court than by all other transfer mechanisms combined (Snyder 
& Sickmund, 2006).  These three broad mechanisms allowing for juvenile transfer are not 
                                                          
7
 In New Mexico, only first degree murder committed by a child of at least 15 is excluded.  Mississippi excludes all 
felonies committed by 17-year-olds.  In Idaho and New York, offenses committed against a person or property by a 
child of at least 14 are excluded.  Florida and Nevada have no specified age for which you can have a offense 
excluded.  In Georgia, only for offenses against a person committed by a child of at least 13 is excluded. (Griffin et 
al., 1998) 
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including the states that have mandatory transfers or blended sentencing
8
 as other options 
(Dawson, 2000; Shook, 2005).  The overall result from the statutory changes is that it is now 
easier for states to transfer juveniles to adult court (Brannen et al, 2006; Grisso, 1996; Redding, 
2003).  Since 1992, all states except Nebraska have changed their statutes to make it easier for 
juveniles to be tried in criminal court (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).   
 
Transfer Criteria Constructs 
 
Research has examined the various constructs that make up the factors needing 
consideration for a judicial decision to transfer.  About three-fourths of the states have enacted 
by statue or adopted through court decision criteria similar to those set out in the Kent opinion 
(Feld, 1987).  Disparity exists regarding the number of Kent factors that should be considered in 
transfer decisions (Salekin, et al, 2002).  Research and legal theorists have claimed that an 
appropriate range of factors for consideration consists of one to five factors.  For instance, 
Melton, Petrila, Poythress, and Slobogin (2007) suggested amenability to treatment should be the 
primary factor considered in transfer evaluations.  Grisso, Tomkins, and Casey (1988) found (a) 
dangerousness and (b) amenability to treatment to be essential.  Ewing (1990), on the other hand, 
suggested three factors:  (a) dangerousness, (b) sophistication-maturity, and (c) amenability to 
treatment.  The most inclusive suggestion came from Heilbrun, Leheny, Thomas, and Hyneycutt 
                                                          
8
 Blended sentencing is a legislative change aimed at enhancing sentencing authority and punishments in juvenile 
courts by allowing the juvenile court to impose adult sentences or extend their sentencing jurisdiction into early 
adulthood (Redding & Howell, 2000).   
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(1997) who reviewed juvenile transfer statutues and found five key factors:  (a) treatment needs 
and amenability, (b) risk assessment of future criminality, (c) sophistication-maturity, (d) the 
presence of mental retardation or mental illness, and (e) offense characteristics.  Most recently, 
Salekin et al. (2002) suggested that three factors best capture criteria pertinent to transfer (a) 
dangerousness (risk), (b) sophistication-maturity, and (c) amenability to treatment.  For this 
study we have decided to use 2 of the three factors considered most recently by Salekin et al. 
(2002), excluding sophistication and maturity.  While states vary on the number of above 
mentioned factors that could be used in transfer decisions, sophistication-maturity is one factor 
not always required (Salekin et al., 2002).  Additionally, the vignettes used in this study are 
much better constructed without the need to include and vary the sophistication factor.  Despite 
the disparity among states regarding which factors should be used in making juvenile transfer 
decisions, it is important to consider in more detail how juvenile court judges weigh these factors 
when presented with a case (Brannen et al., 2006).   The present study will consider several 
factors that may influence judges’ perceptions about their transfer decisions.  Despite the reality 
that the structure of the state statutes must follow the ruling in Kent, states may adopt guidelines 
to the rules (Kfoury, 1987).  Thus, statutes that juvenile court judges must follow in their transfer 
decisions vary by state (D’Angelo, 2007).   
The present study surveyed juvenile court judges from all 50 states, thereby evaluating 
what factors (risk, treatment amenability, and nature of weapon) would have the most influence 
on a judge’s decision to transfer a juvenile to adult criminal court.  This study asked judges to 
make a decision on transfer assuming that their particular state granted them to power to make a 
judicial transfer, even if they are working in a state using some other transfer mechanism.  
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Presently in the United States there are only fourteen states using judicial transfer as the sole 
transfer mechanism (See Appendix A).
9
 
   Examining whether judges are influenced by perceived risk of future offending (risk), 
amenability to treatment (rehabilitation), or possibly some other factor like the juvenile 
offender’s use of or being in possession of a gun during the crime (nature of weapon) is an 
important approach in determining how real-world judicial transfer decisions are actually being 
made (Brannen et al., 2006; Fagan & Deschenes, 1990; Howell, 1996; Podkopacz & Feld, 1995).  
In real-world decision-making, judges are almost always influenced by public safety 
(risk/dangerousness factor) above any other factors considered in transfer decisions (Brannen et 
al., 2006).   Therefore, the ―risk‖ for reoffending in the future factor is highly influential to 
judges.  Judges are generally less concerned about the psychological and treatment progress of 
juvenile offenders as they see their first priority as a judge is to protect the public.  Brannen et al 
(2006) reported, ―regardless of whether or not the juvenile is amenable to treatment, if a youth 
poses any type of threat to the community, he or she is likely to be transferred to adult court.   
In an attempt to clarify the constructs from the Kent decision, (dangerousness (risk), 
sophistication-maturity, and amenability), Salekin, et al. (2001) had clinical psychologists rate 
the ―prototypicality‖ of each concept.  Results indicated that basic characteristics representing 
dangerousness included engaging in extreme, unprovoked violence; a severe aggressive, 
antisocial personality; a lack of remorse or guilt and a lack of empathy; and showing a leadership 
                                                          
9
 In fourteen states judicial waiver operates in an environment in which legislative exclusion and prosecutorial 
discretion are not available:  Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia (Griffin et al., 1998). 
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role in the crime.  However, ―risk” or dangerousness, as most commonly defined and for the 
purpose of this study, represents the potential or ―risk‖ for re-offending, and re-arrest for a 
violent crime(s) against a person.  Get a Reference Sophistication-maturity involved criminal 
sophistication, the ability to plan and premeditate the crimes, an understanding of behavioral 
norms, and the ability to indentify alternative options.   Lastly, the characteristics representing 
amenability to treatment were motivation for treatment and an expectation of therapeutic gain, an 
awareness of difficulties and wanting to change them, demonstration of remorse or guilt and 
empathy, knowledge of right from wrong, and a stable and supportive family (Salekin, 2001).  
Heilbrun et al., (1997) addressed a policy-relevant question concerning the extent to 
which rehabilitation remains an explicitly-identified consideration in the decisions about 
transfers made by juvenile courts.  They concluded that rehabilitation is no longer the primary 
goal of the juvenile justice system, but rehabilitation approaches are best considered (in context 
with serious offenses that could lead to transfers) in terms of their value to reduce the risk of 
future crime and violence.  Brannen (2006) reported that of the three Kent constructs, the 
dangerousness construct had the greatest impact, and that amenability to treatment had far less 
effect on a judge’s decision to transfer (Brannen et al., 2006).  This could suggest that judges are 
skeptical about treating juveniles, or that judges simply emphasize accountability and protection 
of the public over the treatment of the youth (Brannen et al., 2006).    
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Judicial Decision Making 
 
Research has suggested that juvenile court judges do not necessarily base their transfer 
decisions on the legal factors specified in their respective state statutes (Champion & Mays, 
1991; Joseph, 1995; Rafter, 1990; Smith, 1987; Worden 1989).  Juvenile court judges sometimes 
consider what is termed ―extra-legal‖ factors such as race, gender, socio-economic status of 
juvenile offenders,  (D’Angelo, 2007).  Even with the statutory sanctioned factors that judges 
should use as guides in judicial decision making, it can be difficult for researchers and even 
judges to clearly identify what is influencing their transfer decisions. 
Decision Making and Weapon Offenses 
 
For a number of reasons, juvenile weapon accessibility has been the basis of considerable 
concern in recent years (Brown, 2004).  Increasing public attention began in the 1980’s as the 
rates of weapon-associated juvenile crime were rising (Finkelhor & Ormond, 2001; Snyder & 
Sickmund, 2000).  Between 1979 and 1989, homicide was the second leading cause of death for 
people between the ages of 15 and 19 years, and the primary cause of death for black males in 
this age category (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1990).  Juveniles can often obtain 
firearms without difficulty.  Based on data gathered from states in California, Illinois, Louisiana, 
and New Jersey, investigators reported that 83% of incarcerated juveniles owned guns at the time 
of their incarceration, and 22% of male high school students owned guns (Wright, Sheley, Smith, 
1992).  A study of adjudicated juveniles in a detention center in Seattle, Washington, indicates 
that almost 60% of the adjudicated delinquents owned handguns (Callahan, Rivara, & Farrow, 
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1993), and more than one third of high school students surveyed in Seattle reported having easy 
access to handguns (Callahan & Rivara, 1992).  Juvenile weapon possession is associated with 
alcohol and drug use (Forrest et al., 1996), truancy (Bailey et al., 1997), fighting (DuRant et al., 
1995), and early sexual activity (Kulig et al., 1998).  Researchers have found that weapon 
possession is a significant factor in delinquency.  For example, Cunningham et al. (2000) 
reported that high-risk adolescent gun ownership was linked with measures of antisocial 
behavior, as well as bullying teachers, substance abuse, vandalism, and violence. As a result of 
the increasing juvenile violence and gang activity, a concern emerged that a ―new breed‖ of 
juvenile criminal had evolved; a hard-core, drug dealing, gang-banging, ―superpredator‖ (Brown, 
2004; Esbensen, 2000).    The image of the ―superpredator‖ helped fuel the proliferation of 
transfer legislation in the 1990’s (Feld, 2000; Shook, 2005), and may be affecting judicial 
transfer decisions if a gun is allegedly involved in the offense. 
Albonetti (1991) suggested that judges develop ―patterned responses‖ that are the product 
of attribution involving the offender’s likelihood of committing a future crime.  The study found 
that judges attribute stable enduring causes to offenders who use a weapon in committing a 
crime, which increased sentence severity when controlling for statutory severity (Albonetti, 
1991). Another study aimed at identifying significant influences in transfer decisions in Virginia 
found that using a firearm in the current offense was one of the 13 significant predictors
10
 of 
                                                          
10
 Significant predictor variables:  1) Age 17 at time of offense, 2) Primary offense is selling drugs, 3) Primary 
offense is rape, 4) Primary offense is murder/manslaughter, 5) Firearm was used during the offense, 6) Number of 
prior felony property adjudications, 7) Any prior felony drug adjudications, 8) Any prior felony person 
adjudications, 9) Any other prior felony adjudications, 10) Any prior learning center commitments, 11) Any prior 
mental health treatment, 12) Case handled in metropolitan court, 13) 9
th
 grade education or higher 
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juvenile transfer (Poulos & Orchowsky, 1994).  According to the Center for the Study and 
Prevention of Violence (2008), the use of a weapon in the commission of an offense has a 
significant effect on the decision to transfer a juvenile to criminal court.   
Judicial decision-making in transfer cases may also be influenced by public outrage over 
crimes involving guns, and juveniles access to firearms.  An article written by Jennifer Sullivan 
of The Seattle Times (2009) describes King County Prosecutor Dan Satterberg’s attempt to 
propose legislation changing the prosecution of juveniles linked to gun crimes.  Satterberg 
commented, ―By the time a juvenile has picked up a gun and is firing shots at other people, they 
are no longer juveniles in either my view or in the eyes of the law.‖   
Juvenile crime, particularly weapons offenses, has increased public concern about 
juvenile punishment and apparently affected the expansion of transfer laws.  This is part of a 
larger trend toward greater retribution and public safety, with less emphasis on rehabilitation that 
has been seen in the juvenile system over the last twenty years (Witt, 2003). 
Theories on Judicial Decision Making 
 
There are various theories on judicial decision making.  Some suggest that judicial 
decision making is often influenced by factors that are beyond legally defined boundaries.  In 
particular, these include: 1) Structural Organizational Approach, 2) Causal Attribution, and 3) 
Wrightsman’s (1999) Three Part model of judicial decision making: (a) Legal Model, (b) 
Attitudinal Model, (c) Cognitive Model.    
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Structural Organizational Approach 
Proponents of the structural organizational approach (March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 
1957) assert that rational choice models of decision making provide a useful departure for 
understanding the exercise of judicial discretion (Albonetti, 1991).  According to this model, a 
decision must be made with knowledge of all the possible alternatives in order to be rational.  In 
reality, however, decision makers rarely have complete information with which to construct a 
―fully rational‖ decision (Simon, 1957).  The underlying belief is that having complete 
knowledge ―eliminates uncertainty in decision making and decision outcomes‖ (Albonetti, 1991, 
p. 248).  In cases where it is impossible to have complete knowledge, the actor (judge) attempts 
to reduce uncertainty by relying upon a rationality that is the product of habit and social structure 
(Albonetti, 1991; Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967).  Simon (1957) argues that the 
limits to decision making rationality are managed through organizational arrangements such as 
established operation procedures, a division of labor, a hierarchy of authority, formal channels of 
communication, professional training, and indoctrination.  These structures ―absorb uncertainty,‖ 
resulting in a ―bounded rationality‖ (March & Simon, 1958; Albonetti, 1991, p. 249).  The result 
is decision making based on ―past experiences, stereotypes, prejudices, and highly particularized 
views of present stimuli (Clegg & Dunkerley, 1980, p. 265).  Judges seek to achieve a form of 
rationality by developing ―patterned responses‖ that serve to avoid or reduce uncertainty in 
obtaining a desired outcome (March & Simon, 1958; Albonetti, 1991).  These theorists assert 
that problem solving (in judicial decision making) is based on a limited search for satisfying 
rather than optimizing solutions (Albonetti, 1991).  With regard to this notion of ―uncertainty 
avoidance‖ in judicial decision making, Thompson (1967) identified two dimensions around 
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which decision makers organize attempts to reduce uncertainty.  Thompson (1967) suggested 
that uncertainty surrounding both beliefs about the cause and effect relationships, and 
preferences among possible outcomes, is crucial to understanding the use of judicial discretion, 
(particularly at sentencing).  This relates ―offender characteristics, cases processing outcomes, 
and punishment to the goal of reducing the likelihood of recidivism‖ (Albonetti, 1991 p.249).  
The concept of ―patterned response‖ proposed by March and Simon (1958) provides a link to the 
second theory that is useful in understanding discretionary decision making causal attribution in 
punishment.        
Attribution 
 Attribution theorists (e.g. Carroll & Payne, 1976, Hawkins, 1980, Shaver, 1975) suggest 
that judgments of causality are made for both personal and environmental influences that are 
believed to contribute to behavior (Albonetti, 1991).  Shaver (1975) studied the relationship 
between the perceiver’s characteristics and attributions of responsibility.   Referring to Shaver’s 
work, Hawkins (1981) commented that: 
  (the) perceiver’s attributional choice may affect their perception of 
remedies or control mechanism needed where perceived behavior  
is negatively valued.  Crime represents a form of negatively valued 
behavior, and criminal punishment represents a means of control.  
Therefore the perception of criminal behavior may involve processes of 
attribution and perceptions for punishment.  For example, a perceiver  
may believe that a violent criminal offender is an aggressive person or 
alternatively that environmental factors precipitated the criminal act.   
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Perceptual differences such as this may in turn lead to conclusions  
regarding the possibility of the offender’s rehabilitation potential, the  
threat posed to society, and the type of criminal sanction imposed 
 (Hawkins, 1981 p. 280). 
 
Other researchers investigating the relationship between causal attribution and judicial discretion 
among municipal court judges have concluded that judges do attribute meaning to past and future 
behavior consistent with stereotypes associated with membership in social categories (Fontaine 
& Emily, 1978).  These findings are consistent with Lippman’s (1922) research showing a link 
between social category attributions of specific traits of behavior and Stephan’s (1975) research 
indicating that membership in a certain social group influences verdicts and sentences (Albonetti, 
1991; Schutz, 1962).  
 Based on the theories of uncertainty avoidance and causal attribution in punishment, one 
could hypothesize that juvenile court judges would attempt to alleviate the uneasiness of 
uncertainty in transfer decisions by developing ―patterned responses‖ that are the products of an 
attribution process influenced by causal judgments.  Juvenile court judges would rely on 
stereotypes that link race, gender, and outcomes from earlier processing stages to the likelihood 
of future criminal activity.  Imposing punishment (or transfer) would be influenced by making 
such causal assumptions in an effort to achieve rationality. 
Wrightsman’s 3 part Model: 
 Legal 
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The legal model is probably assumed to be the most influential in judicial decision making.  The 
traditional answer to the question ―How does a judge decide?‖ relies on the legal reasoning so 
valued in law school (and in society at large) (Cauffman et al., 2007; Hochstedler, 1987; Spohn, 
2002; Wrightsman, 1999).  The legal model asserts that the ―judge considers the facts and issues 
of the current case and relates them to previous decisions, to applicable laws, and to the 
Constitution‖ (Wrightsman, 1999, p.19).  In a public address in 1996, Justice Clarence Thomas 
said that he always asks himself, ―What is my role in this case as a judge, not as a politician, a 
citizen, or a policy maker?‖ (Wrightsman, 1999, p. 19-20).  However, the legal model may not 
best describe all of the intricate processes that are a part of judicial decision making as evidenced 
by split decisions, and various judicial interpretations and applications of the law in cases.  In 
sharp contrast to the sentiments of Justice Thomas in 1996, over a century ago the much revered 
Oliver Wendell Holmes indicated, ―…a decision is the unconscious result of instinctive 
prejudices and inarticulate connections…even the prejudices which judges share with their 
fellow men have a good more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men 
should be governed‖ ( Holmes, 1886, p. 35).  Additionally, one of America’s leading 
contributors to jurisprudence, Chancellor James Kent, said in explaining how he reached a 
decision, ―…I might once in a while be embarrassed by a technical rule, but I almost always 
found principles suited to my view of the case…‖ (Frank, 1963, p. 112).  One more recent 
example is found in a U.S. Supreme Court decision (Lewis v. United States, 1996) with a slim 5-
to-4 majority, where one of the dissenters, Justice Kennedy called the decision ―one of the most 
serious incursions on the right to a jury trial in the Court’s history‖ (Lewis v. United States, 1996, 
p. 2167)  Wrightsman noted, ―such a deep-set of differences of reactions makes one wonder, if 
  JUVENILE TRANSFER 32 
 
the difference is merely a matter of interpreting the Constitution differently, or if deep-set values 
about the relative rights of defendants and the purpose of the criminal justice system are the most 
likely explanation for the often-contrasting votes by justices‖ (Wrightsman, 1999, p. 20).  If the 
legal model is used, then a judge deciding a transfer case involving a juvenile in possession of a 
gun during the commission of a crime would use only legally relevant facts (e.g. dangerousness, 
treatment amenability) and not any personal desire to preclude any juvenile possessing a gun 
during a crime, in making this decision.  
   Attitudinal Model 
The attitudinal model is representative of how personal attitudes and values directly affect the 
decision making process (Jones & Cauffman, 2008).  The attitudinal model proposes that if a 
challenged behavior is inconsistent with a judges’ ideological perspective, then that judge will 
decide to reject the behavior (Rowland, & Carp, 1996, Wrightsman, 1999).  Political scientists 
have relied on social psychology, focusing on the issues of social attitude, which as been defined 
as a relatively enduring, organized reaction (Wrightsman, 1999).  Rohde and Spaeth (1976), 
proponents of the attitudinal model, extended this position into ―an explicitly goal-oriented 
model‖ by assuming that the goals that influence judges are policy based (Rowland & Carp, 
1996, Wrightsman, 1999).  The conclusion that ―judges vote their attitudes‖ presented by Segal 
and Sapeth’s (1993) 
Though attitudes may be said to have cognitive, affective, and  
behavioral components, our concern is with the votes of justices, 
and thus the behavioral component of attitudes.  These attitudes 
and the values with which they associate should cause a behaviorally 
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predisposed justice to support certain legal claims and to oppose  
others, while other justices behave in an opposite fashion 
(p. 69). 
 
D’angelo (2007) surveyed judges and found that judge’s attitudes, and the type of 
weapons used in the offense, were among the influences on judge’s transfer decisions.  Using the 
attitudinal model, one could conclude that if a judge is deciding a transfer case involving a 
juvenile in possession of a gun during an offense, and the judges’ attitude toward juvenile gun 
violence precluded youth from being afforded rehabilitation in the juvenile system, then that 
judge would ―vote their attitude‖ and transfer the juvenile to criminal court.      
Cognitive Model 
The cognitive model suggests that the decision making is a process affected by one’s schemas11, 
or perceptions.
 
  The attitudinal and cognitive models of judicial decision making share some 
overlap, but are largely distinct.  Whereas, the attitudinal model suggests that judges make 
decisions based on their pre-existing attitudes, the cognitive model focuses more on the process 
of decision making, with attitudes acting as filters through which information is interpreted (Fisk 
& Taylor, 1991; Jones & Cauffman, 2008).
12
  The cognitive model proposes that decisions are a 
product of social cognition, emphasizing process, examining cognitive processes that mediate 
the relationship between stimuli (a juvenile offense case) and response (judges transfer decision) 
                                                          
11
 Schemas are considered to be an organized body of knowledge from past experience that is used to interpret a new 
experience (Wrightsman, 1999). 
12
 According to the attitudinal model, a pro-death-penalty judge will always support the death penalty regardless of 
the case, but the cognitive model suggest that characteristics of a case are perceived through the lens of a pro-death-
penalty attitude, but the decision is not based solely on that attitude (Jones & Cauffman, 2008). 
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(Wrightsman, 1999).  A central concept for social cognition theorist is the schema.  Each of us 
have schemas (knowledge based on prior experience) that can be used to encode, retrieve, and 
interpret relevant information when we encounter new situations (Wrightsman, 1999).  As 
Bersoff (1992) notes, developing literature on human judgment, inference, and information 
processing reveal barriers to accurate judgment called ―bounded rationality‖ that negatively 
affects the reliability and validity of human decision-making.  These potential errors in judgment 
have been more comprehensively studied through the work of Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahnemann (1974) who delineated strategic principles that humans commonly use to simplify 
complex decision-making tasks.  In the present study, the implication of heuristics represent the 
information processing strategies that juvenile court judges would use in an effort to reduce 
complex judgmental tasks (transfer decisions) to a set of simpler operations.  These strategies 
would be innate, automatic processes operating without an act of volition and, presumably, 
outside of the judge’s awareness and often lead to erroneous decision-making (Bersoff, 1992).  It 
is important to note that a schema is different from an attitude.  The attitudinal model of judicial 
decision making assumes that the attitude and values directed behavior, and that judicial 
decisions are derived from them.  However, the cognitive model places more emphasis on the 
perception; though one’s attitudes may play a role as filters, they are less likely to causally 
influence (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Wrightman, 1999).  Under the cognitive model of decision-
making, one could assume that if a juvenile judge making a transfer decision regarding a juvenile 
in possession of a gun during an offense had a schema that any juvenile carrying a gun would be 
a threat to public safety, then that schematic perception would be very difficult to overcome even 
in the face of other evidence regarding overall limited threat to public safety.  
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Present Study 
Rationale 
The study had two major purposes.  First, it was designed to test juvenile court judge’s 
reported likelihood of transferring a juvenile to criminal court after considering evidence on risk, 
amenability to treatment, and nature of weapon.  Second, the study sought to examine the 
relative strength and possible interactions of these influences in a vignette-based survey.  Judges 
from all 50 states were surveyed. 
The four hypotheses for this study are derived from previous research and theory 
(Brannen, 2006; D’Angelo, 2007; Heilbrun et al., 1997; Salekin et al, 2001; Salekin et al., 2002, 
Zimring, 1998).  
Hypotheses 
It was hypothesized that when presented with vignettes in which the variables (a) risk of 
reoffending (high/low), (b) amenability to treatment (high/low), and (c) nature of weapon 
(gun/knife) are systematically manipulated, judges’ responses would show a statistically 
significant main effect or interactions among these three factors, with the dependent variable 
consisting of respondents’ rating of the likeliness to transfer juvenile to criminal court.   
 More specifically:  
Null:  Individuals described as high risk will not differ significantly from individuals 
described as low risk in the likelihood rated by responding judges that this individual 
would be transferred to criminal court. 
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Alternative:  Individuals described as high risk will differ significantly from individuals 
described as low risk in the likelihood rated by the responding judge that this individual 
would be transferred to criminal court. 
 
Null:  Individuals described as amenable to treatment will not differ significantly from 
individuals described as not amenable to treatment in the likelihood rated by the 
responding judge that this individual would be transferred to criminal court. 
 
Alternative:  Individuals described as amenable to treatment will differ significantly from 
individuals described as not amenable to treatment in the likelihood rated by the 
responding judge that this individual would be transferred to criminal court. 
 
Null:  Individuals allegedly using or being in possession of a gun during the commission 
of a crime will not differ significantly from individuals allegedly using or in possession 
of a knife in the likelihood rated by the responding judge that this individual would be 
transferred to criminal court.   
Alternative:   Individuals allegedly using or being in possession of a gun during the 
commission of a crime will differ significantly from individuals allegedly using or in 
possession of a knife in the likelihood rated by the responding judge that this individual 
would be transferred to criminal court.   
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Method 
 
Participants 
 Participants were drawn from all 50 states from the membership list of the National 
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (NCJFCJ).   
A power analysis revealed that for a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA (all between subjects factors) 
with an alpha of .05, a medium effect size (f = .25) for future offending risk (high/low), 
amenability to treatment (high/low), and nature of weapon (gun/knife) and all three variables 
together, 30 participants per group are needed to achieve a power of .80 according to Cohen’s 
(1988) power tables.  Therefore, to achieve the necessary power, this study needed 240 judges to 
participate (N=240).  To account for possible interaction effects, the sample size was increased 
by 50% (N = 360).  Additional participants were needed to account for surveys not completed 
(25% attrition) (N = 480).  Therefore, to achieve the desirable level of power (.80), 480 judges 
needed to be surveyed for this study. 
Design 
 The study used a 2 (risk for future offending high/low) x 2 (treatment amenability 
high/low) x 2 (nature of weapon: gun/knife) between subjects design.  Eight versions of a 
vignette, systematically manipulating the 3 dichotomous variables, were used.  The survey’s 
vignettes were constructed in light of the little research that appears in the literature, and in 
consultation with several of the study’s committee members who have a great deal of experience 
in conducting forensic evaluations (see Appendix B).  Judicial transfer decisions are determined 
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by state statute; there is no single standard across states.  However, each state uses some 
variation of the factors presented in Kent.   
The dependent variable is the respondent’s rating of the likelihood that the respondent 
would transfer the juvenile to criminal court.  For each vignette, respondents rated this likelihood 
on a five point scale (1 = not at all likely, 2 = not likely, 3 = moderately likely, 4 = likely, and 5 = 
highly likely).  In addition to this continuous rating, the study asked that judges decide (forced 
choice:  yes or no) whether they would transfer the particular youth in the case vignette to adult 
court (see Appendix C).  Additionally, the survey asked whether additional variables such as 
forensic evaluations and public opinion influence a judge’s judicial transfer decision, as well as 
questions related to transfer in general and juvenile weapon offenses.  Many of these additional 
survey variables were selected because they appeared frequently in the research literature (see 
Appendix D). 
Procedures 
 All participants received a brief email that explained the study and the procedures 
(Appendix E).  The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (NCJFCJ) granted the 
investigators permission to use their members from all 50 states for the study, and were solely 
responsible for the dissemination of the study’s e-mails (including the Survey Methods link) to 
each member.  The NCJFCJ disseminated this study via e-mail to over 1,400 members.  In an 
effort by the NCJFCJ to protect the privacy of their judicial membership and to guard members’ 
contact information, the investigator did not have access to their e-mail addresses and could not 
directly communicate with any of the participants. The e-mail that was sent each participant (via 
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NCJFCJ) informed the judges that the survey should take about 15 minutes to complete.  Each 
judge was invited to participate in an online survey (see Appendix C).  The first part of the 
survey presented the participants with one of the vignettes (see Appendix B), and each was asked 
to answer a question based on the vignette.  Next, they were presented with a demographic 
questionnaire concerning gender, race, geographic area of service, years of experience, 
experience with psychological evaluations generally, experience with transfer cases, views on 
gun control, and knowledge of applicable law (see Appendix D).  
 
Results 
 
Judges were asked to rate their likelihood of transferring the juvenile in the vignette to 
criminal court.  The manipulations allowed measurement of the impact of the variables of risk, 
treatment amenability and the nature of weapon.   
A power analysis revealed that for a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA (all between subjects factors) 
with an alpha of .05 and assuming a medium effect size (f = .25), 30 participants per group were 
needed to achieve a power of .80 (Cohen, 1988).  Therefore, in order to achieve the necessary 
power, this study needed 240 judges to participate.  To account for interaction effects, the sample 
size needed to be increased by 50% (N = 360).  Additional participants were needed to account 
for surveys not completed (with 25% attrition, the required number of participants would be 
480).  Since a total of 305 judges participated in the study however there were unequal cells 
across the eight groups ranging from a few as 3 participants (group 8) to 73 participants (group 
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6).  Thus, ability to detect and reliably interpret significant main effects and interaction effects 
was limited.    
According to the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (NCJFCJ), 
which distributed the survey, approximately 1,400 judges received it.  The representative from 
the NCJFCJ randomly assigned the group participants to a group (1-8) by assigning each judge a 
specific group according to the order in which their name appeared on the membership list.  For 
instance the first eight judges whose names appeared on the membership list were in group one 
thru eight respectively.  That process was continued until the last judge was assigned a group.  A 
total of 305 judges responded, a response rate of 20.5%, with 254 completing the entire survey.  
There was a large range of participants in each cell with group eight having the fewest 
representative (3 judges) and group six having the greatest number of participants (73).   This 
discrepancy in assignment is significant and has an extreme effect on our ability to interpret our 
results with confidence as this has led to a violation of one of the assumptions of ANOVA, 
homogeneity of variance.  This limitation is discussed in further detail in the discussion section. 
Given the unequal groups the results should be interpreted with caution.  (See Table 2 for a 
description of frequency of participants per vignette group).  
 Descriptive Statistics  
The participants were asked about their race and ethnicity.  The majority of the 
participants who responded were White (non-Hispanic) (87.2%, n=218).  Some participants 
(18%, n=55) declined to answer the question.  The mean age of the participants was 55.7.   The 
majority of respondents who identified their gender were male (n=146, or 58.2%) (See Table 3 
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for a more detailed description of participant’s gender and racial and ethnic identity).  A total of 
54 responding judges declined to report gender.  There was a large range in the number of 
juvenile transfer decisions that participating judges reported making in the past year.  The mean 
number of juvenile transfers made in the past year was 18 (SD =170.3), with the median and 
mode being 1 and 0, respectively.  There was also a large range in the number of juvenile 
transfers judges reported making over their careers.  The mean number of juvenile transfers 
made over their career was 67 (SD=377.015), with a median and mode of 10 and 0, respectively.  
In addition, participants were also asked about the number of forensic evaluations they had read 
in the past year and over their careers.  The mean number of forensic evaluations they reported 
reading in the past year was 16 (SD=116.01); the median and mode were 0 and 0, respectively.  
The mean number of evaluations that participating judges reported reading over the course of 
their careers was 57 (SD=315.88) (median and mode were 2 and 0, respectively) (see Table 4).   
Since the study focused on the influences on judges’ decisions to transfer a juvenile to 
adult court, participants were asked about their familiarity with their state’s statutes on juvenile 
transfer--and what transfer provisions they are required to follow in their state.  Almost all of the 
participants (98.4%, n=240) reported that they were familiar with their respective state’s transfer 
provisions, while the remaining 1.6% of participants (n=4) reported that they were not familiar 
with relevant state transfer provisions.  A number of participants chose not to answer this 
question (20%, n=61) but 80% of the participants (n=244) did.  A total of 70.2% (n=214) of 
respondents reported that their state has transfer provisions best categorized as (1) judicial 
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discretion, (2) 43.3% (n=132) had prosecutorial and direct file, and (3)32.5 (n=132, and 32.5% 
(n=99) had statutory exclusion as a provision.
13
 
Participants were asked to report their state of practice.  All states were represented in the 
responding sample except Alabama, Maine, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Dakota, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Utah and West Virginia.  Judges from The District of Columbia were 
also invited to participate in the survey, but none responded (see Table 5).  The largest 
proportion of participants reported working in an urban setting (43.2%, n = 104), while the 
remainder of respondents reported working in either a rural setting (31.1%, n = 75) or a suburban 
setting (25.7%, n = 62).   
Participants were asked if they believed juvenile courts should focus more on 
rehabilitation or retribution.  The vast majority of participants (77.7%, n = 237) reported their 
belief that the court should focus more on rehabilitation of juveniles, while .7% (n= 2) reported 
they believed the court should focus more on retribution.  There were some participants (21.6%, 
n=66) who declined to answer that question.  When participants were asked whether they 
believed rehabilitation or retribution was favored more by the public as the focus of juvenile 
court, 39.7% (n=121) perceived that the public favors retribution and 38% (n=116) said the 
public favors rehabilitation.  Some individuals (22.3%, n=68) chose not to answer that question.   
                                                          
13
 Many states have more than one option available when making a transfer decision.  See Table 1 for states and 
corresponding transfer provisions.  Participants were allowed to select as many transfer provisions as 
representative of the number of available transfer options for their particular jurisdiction. 
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Since type of weapon (gun/knife) is being investigated for its potential influence a 
judge’s transfer decision, participants were asked whether they believe that public safety will be 
enhanced if stricter gun laws are created and enforced.   Respondents were almost equally 
divided; 40.7%, (n=124) believed that public safety would be enhanced if stricter gun laws were 
created and enforced, whereas 37.7% (n=115) reported that public safety would not be enhanced.   
A total of 21.6% of judges (n=66) did not respond to this question. 
Results of Specific Hypotheses 
 
 A 2 (risk) x 2 (treatment amenability) x 2 (nature of weapon) ANOVA was conducted to 
examine the influence of these three factors on judges’ decision-making in transfer cases.  
ANOVA has three assumptions: 1) normality, 2) homogeneity of variance, and 3) independence.  
As to the first assumption, the populations from which the samples are drawn must be normal.  
With a large sample, this is usually not an issue; further, ANOVA cutoff scores are reasonably 
accurate even when the population is moderately far from normal.  Homogeneity of variance is 
the second assumption of ANOVA; it refers to the assumption that the variances in the different 
groups in the design are identical or the spread of scores in each cell in the design is equivalent.  
The result from Levene’s Test for Equality of Variable is significant (p < .001), suggesting that 
the assumption of homogeneity of variance has been violated.  This violation suggests that we 
should interpret the findings with caution.  Lastly, independence means that observations in each 
sample must be independent.  The independence assumption was met in this study.  See Table 6 
for a summary of the results of the ANOVA analysis.   
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Hypotheses were tested as follows 
Main Effects 
Individuals described as high risk will differ significantly from individuals described as 
low risk in the likelihood rated by the responding judge that this individual would be   
transferred to criminal court. 
The results indicated that there was a main effect for risk of future offending [F(1, 257) = 
34.843, p < .001].  The effect size was small (partial eta squared = .12).  The mean for the 
judges’ rated likelihood to transfer an individual described as high risk for future offending was 
3.2 (SD=1.3).  The mean for the judge’s likelihood to transfer an individual described as low risk 
for future offending was 2.2 (SD=1.1).   Thus, juveniles’ risk for future offending significantly 
affected judges’ decisions to transfer them to criminal court.  Judges report that they are more 
likely to transfer youth who are at high risk for future offending.   
 
Individuals described as amenable to treatment will differ significantly from individuals 
described as not amenable to treatment in the likelihood rated by the responding judge that this 
individual would be transferred to criminal court. 
There was no statistically significant main effect for treatment amenability [F (1, 257) = 
3.025, p = .083], although there was a trend in the direction of significance.  The mean for the 
judge’s likelihood to transfer an individual described as amenable to treatment was 2.9 (SD=1.2).  
The mean for the judge’s likelihood to transfer an individual described as not amenable to 
treatment was 3.1 (SD=1.4). The effect size was small (partial eta squared = .01). Juveniles’ 
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treatment amenability does not significantly affect a judge’s decision to transfer them to criminal 
court, when considering this result conservatively.  Despite the trend toward significance, 
however, the effect size was small—indicating that even an increase in the sample size might not 
enhance the level of statistical significance very much.     
 
Individuals allegedly using or being in possession of a gun during the commission of a 
crime will differ significantly from individuals allegedly using or in possession of a knife in the 
likelihood rated by the responding judge that this individual would be transferred to criminal 
court.   
There was a main effect for weapon type [F (1, 257) = 11.265, p < .01].  The mean for the 
judge’s rated likelihood of transferring an individual in possession of a gun was 3.4 (SD=1.2).  
The mean for the judge’s rated likelihood to transfer an individual in possession of a knife was 
2.7 (SD=1.2).  The effect size was small (partial eta squared = .04).  The type of weapon used by 
the juvenile significantly affects a judge’s decision to transfer them to criminal court, therefore, 
with youth in possession of a gun rated as significantly more likely to be transferred to criminal 
court.   
Interactions 
Results revealed a statistically significant two-way interaction between risk for future 
offending and treatment amenability ([F (1, 257) = 13.825, p < .001].  This effect size was small 
(partial eta squared = .051) (see Figure 1).  The mean scores describing the interaction represent 
the probability that a juvenile would be transferred (see Figure 2).  In youth with low treatment 
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amenability, judges reported that they were more likely to transfer the youth to criminal court 
when they were also at high risk for reoffending (M=3.6).  Youth with high risk and high 
treatment amenability (M=3.0), judges were likely to transfer the youth but less likely than in the 
previous scenario.  For youth with high treatment amenability, judges reported a much lower 
likelihood of transferring youth who are low risk for reoffending (M=2.4).  The highest 
likelihood for transfer is the group of youths with low treatment amenability and high risk for 
reoffending. The lowest likelihood for transferring a youth to criminal court is low treatment 
amenability and low risk for reoffending (M=2.0) (see Table 7).  In light of the statistically 
significant interaction between risk and treatment amenability, it is this interaction (rather than 
the results of the main effect testing) that should be emphasized in the interpretation of results.  
As may be seen, treatment amenability doesn’t make much difference when risk is low—but 
when low treatment amenability is combined with high risk, this combination makes it 
significantly more likely that the youth will be transferred. After finding a significant interaction 
effect an analysis of simple main effects were conducted to disentangle the interaction.  Post hoc 
analyses were run using Tukey’s test and reveal that the main effects and interaction remain.     
Due to the unequal and extreme range of participants per group cells, the homogeneity of 
variance assumption was violated, which has the potential to undermine the confidence with 
which we can interpret the results.  In an effort to determine whether the violation of this 
assumption affected whether these findings could be interpreted with sufficient 
confidence, additional 2x2 ANOVAs across groups were conducted.  Despite the homogeniety 
violation, the 2x2 results for the main effects and interaction found in the 2x2x2 factorial 
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ANOVA remain.  Across groups there were significant main effects for risk for reoffending and 
weapon, and no significant main effect was found for treatment amenability.  Additionally, there 
was a significant interaction between risk and treatment amenability, and no other interactions 
were found.  
 
Transfer:  Yes or No? 
 
T-Test 
Statistically significant differences were noted in the way the judges responded when 
they were presented with a 5-point Likert scale, as contrasted with the more ecologically valid 
choice (yes or no) regarding whether they would transfer the juvenile in the vignette to adult 
criminal court (t = -17.874, p = .001).  Judges who responded yes (M=3.96, SD = .963), when 
presented with a dichotomous, forced-choice option, were significantly more likely to report a 
higher likelihood to transfer on the 5-point scale compared to judges who judges who responded 
no (M =2.03, SD =.765).  Given that the assumption of homogeneity of variance is violated, the 
ANOVA and t-test results should be interpreted with caution (See Table 7). 
Chi Square Test for Forced Choice 
There were five groups that had statistically significant results.  Group 1, (X
2 
= 28.434, p 
= .001)
; 
Group 3,( X
2
 =30.271¸ p =.001); Group 4, ( X
2 
= 16.575, p = .001); Group 5, (X
2
 = 
14.331, p = .006) and Group 6, (X
2
 = 40.432, p = .001).  There was a statistically significant 
difference in the way the judges responded when they were presented with a five point scale as 
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opposed to when they were forced to choose (yes or no) if they would or would not transfer the 
juvenile in the vignette to adult criminal court.   
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Discussion 
 
There has been little empirical research to date in the area of influences on judicial 
transfer decisions. The present study examined the juvenile court judges’ reported likelihood of 
transferring a juvenile to criminal court after considering evidence on risk, amenability to 
treatment, and nature of weapon.  These influences were considered using a vignette-based 
survey sent to judges from all 50 states.  Judges’ overall mean likelihood of transferring a 
juvenile was very close to the middle of a 5-point scale (M = 2.96, SD = 1.29).  In a forced-
choice circumstance, close to half of the responding judges (51%) reported that they would not 
transfer the juvenile to criminal court.  Judges reported being more likely to transfer juveniles to 
criminal court when they are at high risk for offending, but there was a significant interaction 
between risk and treatment amenability.  Amenability made a substantial difference in the 
decision when the juvenile’s risk was high, but had little influence on the decisions regarding 
low-risk juveniles.  Judges are also more likely to transfer to criminal court depending on the 
nature of weapon is used in the crime, with use of a gun influencing the judge toward transfer 
when contrasted with use of a knife.   
Risk for Future Offending 
 
The present results are consistent with prior research suggesting that risk for reoffending 
(often referred to as ―dangerousness‖) is the most important Kent construct affecting a judge’s 
decision to transfer a juvenile at criminal court (Brannen et al, 2006; Salekin, Neumann, Leistico, 
& Zalot, 2002).   
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The information provided in the hypothetical vignettes was designed to reflect the 
hypothetical juvenile’s risk for reoffending as assessed by a forensic evaluator.  It is likely that 
judges in the current study were more likely to transfer juveniles assessed as high risk due to the 
perception shared by the court and society that public safety is of paramount importance when 
considering the disposition of juvenile offenders.  Research has noted that risk for future 
behavior that would threaten public safety is an important factor in transfer decisions (Heilbrun 
et al, 1997).  The importance of risk in the context of public safety can be seen in transfer 
statutes across the country.  A number of states have changed their statutes to make it easier to 
transfer juveniles to criminal court (Grisso, 1996).  Currently ―dangerousness‖ or ―risk‖ is 
explicitly listed as a factor to be considered in all states (Salekin, Neumann, Leistico, & Zalot, 
2002).   Statutes clearly reflecting public safety concerns typically use language like ―danger to 
the public,‖ ―public protection‖ or broader language such as ―interests of the community‖ 
(Heilbrun et al, 1997).        
Though this study is consistent with previous research suggesting that judges’ transfer 
decisions are most influenced by a juvenile’s risk for reoffending, this is ironic in light of the 
evidence that an increase in transfers does not yield a corresponding decrease in recidivism 
(Fagan, 2008).  Research has suggested that while judges may weigh dangerousness more 
heavily when making transfer decisions, they are often unaware of the specific reasons for 
weighing reoffense risk most heavily (Brannen et al., 2006).  Further research on how and why 
judges are influenced by risk, and how forensic evaluators and assessment instruments can better 
clarify risk for judges, may be quite important in this light.   
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Treatment Amenability 
 
The present study found that a juvenile’s amenability to treatment did not significantly 
influence the judge’s reported likelihood to transfer a juvenile to adult criminal court—unless 
considered when accompanying high reoffense risk.  This is somewhat inconsistent with 
previous findings supporting amenability to treatment as a significant factor in transfer likelihood 
(Brannen et al., 2006).   In another respect, however, the present results are consistent with that 
same study--when juvenile court judges were asked to make a dichotomous decision whether to 
transfer or retain the particular case, amenability to treatment did not emerge as a significant 
predictor of their decisions compared to dangerousness and sophistication/ maturity (Brannen et 
al., 2006).   
This apparently limited influence of treatment amenability may be surprising in light of 
the historical parens patriae model of the juvenile justice system.  There are several reasons why 
the amenability to treatment factor may not be have been a significant influence on judge’s 
transfer decisions in the present study.  First, it is probably not surprising in contemporary 
society that high risk youth are more likely to be transferred to criminal court.  Second, the 
results may indicate that judges have limited confidence in the efficacy of current treatment 
protocols for delinquent youth.  This explanation may have roots in the highly publicized 
negative appraisals of correctional treatment programs in the 1970’s  that challenged the 
rehabilitative ideal on which the juvenile justice system is based, provoking strong arguments 
favoring a punitive response to juvenile delinquency (Izzo & Ross, 1990).  Third, the judges in 
this study may have not been significantly influenced by amenability to treatment because they 
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could be less aware of the therapeutic advances and rehabilitative services that the juvenile 
justices system has made over the last three and a half decades (Kazdin & Weisz, 2003).  In 
addition, judges may not believe that the treatments are appropriate for more serious offenders.  
Fourth, several researchers (Grisso, 2000; Melton et al., 1997; Salekin, 2002) have suggested that 
the amenability concept is a less potent influence in transfer decisions because conclusions about 
amenability in juvenile cases are often based on three considerations:  the juvenile’s 
characteristics, the characteristics of the available treatment methods, and the time available to 
accomplish rehabilitation.  Thus, amenability to treatment may be viewed as a person-situation 
construct (Brannen, 2006).  The present study did not provide much data in the vignette about the 
juvenile’s characteristics, available treatment methods or the time available to accomplish the 
rehabilitation.  Therefore, the judges in this study may have viewed the hypothetical juvenile in 
the vignette who was 16 years old as too old to benefit from rehabilitation.   Previous research 
has shown that judges may have a ―cut off age‖ in their mind that renders some juveniles ill 
suited for the juvenile justice system.  Studies have shown that judges are less likely to transfer 
juveniles 15 years old or younger, and believe that this age group is more likely to be 
rehabilitated than older juvenile offenders (D’Angelo, 2007; Snyder & Sickmund, 1999).   
Interaction between Treatment Amenability and Risk for Future Offending 
 
The interaction between risk and treatment amenability is evidence judicial perceptions in 
this area are complicated.  Despite having a significant main effect for risk and a non-significant 
effect for treatment amenability, the results of this study must be interpreted in light of the 
interaction. Whenever there is a significant interaction, one must be cautious about ―accepting 
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the main effects at face value despite the effects being significant or not…an interaction can 
distort, conceal, or exaggerate the main effects‖ (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2007, p. 485). 
The interaction informs us that the influence of the juvenile’s treatment amenability 
depends upon the juveniles’ risk for future offending.  Specifically, judges are most likely to 
transfer a juvenile to adult criminal court when a juvenile is low on treatment amenability and 
high risk.  Amenability has relatively little impact on the transfer decision, however, for risk who 
are low risk.  This finding is inconsistent with past research (albeit limited to one study) that 
investigated what variables judges rated as having the most significant impact on their decision 
to transfer--in that study, no interaction was detected (Brannen et al., 2006).  Investigators found 
that there were significant main effects for all three variables (dangerousness, sophistication-
maturity, and treatment amenability), with dangerousness accounting for the most variance and 
thus having the most impact on judge’s transfer decisions.  The present findings are similar to 
those of Bannen et al. (2007), although sophistication-maturity was not included in the present 
study.  They reported that youth high in dangerousness and sophistication-maturity but low in 
treatment amenability were the most likely to be transferred to adult court, while a youth low in 
dangerousness and sophistication-maturity but high in treatment amenability was least likely to 
be transferred.   
Research has demonstrated that risk for reoffending is a critical factor which judges and 
the public consider with regard to transferring a juvenile, because of the concern for public 
safety. Brannen et al. (2006) found that 98% of juvenile court judges in their study reported that 
it would be useful for psychological reports to address risk for reoffending.  In the present study, 
the majority of judges (77.7%) believed that the juvenile justice system should emphasize 
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rehabilitative rather than retributive issues, but they reported that a higher percentage of the 
general public (39.7%) would choose to emphasize retribution.    Despite the judges’ beliefs 
regarding rehabilitation (which one would speculate would increase the value placed on the 
amenability to treatment construct), there is a research trend suggesting that juvenile transfers are 
being used with increasing frequency to address the perception that juvenile offenders present a 
risk to public safety (Fagan, 2008).  Considering the significant interaction found in this study, it 
appears that the influence of reoffense risk on judicial transfer decisions may reflect the current 
punitive focus of our justice system, emphasizing retribution rather than rehabilitation to send a 
message that judges are cracking down on juvenile crime to better protect the public. It is 
possible that the judges were not influenced by amenability to treatment in isolation; however, 
the judges may have viewed treatment amenability in light of risk, linking amenability to risk 
reduction, given that risk has been shown to be the most influential factor in transfer decisions.  
Had the vignette described how amenability to treatment could affect or reduce the risk for 
reoffending, it is possible that amenability to treatment would have been a more significant 
influence on judge’s reported decisions.   
Nature of Weapon 
The present study found that the nature of the weapon (gun/knife) had a statistically 
significant effect on the likelihood of transfer to criminal court.  Juveniles in possession of a gun 
rather than a knife were more likely to be transferred.  There is apparently no prior research that 
empirically investigated the influence that the nature of the weapon has on judges’ decisions in 
this regard.  This study appears to be the first to empirically investigate the influence of weapon 
type on the likelihood of transfer.  The most relevant study on this subject was D’Angelo (2007), 
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who used the variable ―Type of Weapon Use‖ as one of four variables that judges had to rate 
regarding juvenile amenability to treatment.  In that study, juvenile court judges perceived the 
type of weapon used in the commission of a crime as in important factor they consider when 
evaluating amenability to treatment (D’Angelo, 2007).  In another study reviewing arrest records 
in Virginia between 1988 thru 1990 (Poulos & Orchowsky, 1994), investigators observed that 
there were 13 variables that significantly predicted the likelihood that a juvenile would be 
transferred to criminal court.  One of these variables was the use of a firearm during the offense 
(Poulos & Orchowsky, 1994).    While there aren’t other studies addressing specifically the 
relationship between weapon and likelihood of transfer, we can consider the findings of other 
studies regarding public opinion on transfer and weapons.  In a study investigating the public’s 
willingness to transfer juveniles to adult criminal court, Feiler and Sheley (1999) found a 
significant relationship between the public’s willingness to transfer a juvenile to criminal court 
and the type of weapon used in the crime--with the use of a gun more strongly associated with 
preference for transfer than the use of a knife and fists.  Other investigators (e.g., Hawkins, 1981; 
Shaver, 1975) suggested that decision makers link characteristics of the offender and offense 
(violence) to judgments of likelihood of future criminal activity (risk) and threat to society, 
which in turn affect punishment severity.  It is suggested that judges attribute stable enduring 
causes to offenders who use a weapon in committing a crime, which leads to increased sentence 
severity (Albonetti, 1991).  Research has shown that as a matter of policy, the critical test for 
transfer is whether it enhances public safety (Fagan, 2008).  It is possible that the judges in our 
study linked the use of a weapon with risk for reoffending, thereby making the use of a gun 
predictive of preference for transfer. In the present study the variable weapon type (gun/knife) 
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was a non-Kent factor for judges to consider.  Given that the type of weapon had a significant 
influence on the likelihood that a judge would transfer a juvenile may suggest that the judges are 
going beyond the limits of Kent when making transfer decisions.  Another possibility is that 
judges may use weapon as a proxy for risk for reoffending when evaluating a case for transfer. 
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Limitations on Research Findings 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate how Kent factors (risk for reoffending and 
treatment amenability) and non-Kent factor (nature of weapon) influence judges’ reported 
preference regarding transferring a juvenile to adult criminal court. Despite the careful attention 
given to designing a study to measure these influences, there were limitations in this study that 
should be addressed.   
First, there is a potential limitation on the generalizability of the study.  The study’s 
methodology attempted to survey a range of judges from juvenile and family court from all 50 
states.  Given the number of judges that were surveyed from the National Council of Juvenile 
and Family Court Judges (approximately 1400), there is an assumption that our sample is 
representative of this population.  Ideally, our sample would have included the requisite number 
of judges who are experienced in reading forensic evaluations and using judicial discretion when 
making a transfer decision; however, not all judges reported experience reading forensic 
evaluations for transfer decisions, and not all of the judges were from states having judicial 
discretion as the transfer mechanism.  Only 16 states have judicial discretion as the sole transfer 
mechanism, and the number of responding judges from those jurisdictions was much too small to 
create the necessary power.  In order to have a sufficiently large population from which to 
sample, the selection criteria extended to any juvenile or family court judge from one of the 50 
states regardless of the state’s transfer provision(s).  This undoubtedly resulted in sampling some 
individuals who were experienced in neither making judicial transfer decisions nor using forensic 
evaluations to assist in those decisions.  Despite the study’s asking participants to answer the 
  JUVENILE TRANSFER 58 
 
survey questions as if they had the legal ability to make a judicial discretionary transfer decision, 
some judges may have been unable to consider the vignette information without removing their 
state’s usual practice for making such a transfer decision 
 Secondly, there could be a limitation related to response bias, as judges who responded to 
an internet survey may systematically differ than those who did not respond.  Additionally, there 
may be a systematic difference in the way judges responded who have experience making 
transfer decisions compared to judges who have little or no experience making transfer decisions.  
Judges were asked how many transfers they had made over their career and in the past year.  The 
mean number of juvenile transfers made in the past year was 18 (SD =170.3), with the median 
and mode being 1 and 0, respectively.  There was also a large range in the number of juvenile 
transfers judges reported making over their careers.  The mean number of juvenile transfers 
made over their career was 67 (SD=377.015), with a median and mode of 10 and 0, respectively.  
Having a mode of 0 for both transfers made in the last year and over a career suggests judge’s 
experience is skewed with some judges having a lot of experience making transfers and some 
judges have no experience.  The most likely rationale contributing to judicial transfer 
inexperience is the use of prosecutorial discretion (direct file), the transfer mechanism that grants 
prosecutors the authority to automatically initiate court proceeding for a juvenile in adult 
criminal court.  Judges who may have more experience actually reviewing the facts of a 
particular case and having to apply Kent constructs when making a transfer decisions may have 
responded to the study’s vignette quite differently then judges who have little or no experience 
actually applying Kent constructs and making transfer decisions.  Attempts were made to make 
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the sample as representative as possible.  The sample was drawn from the membership list of a 
national organization for judges.  Given that approximately 1400 judges were emailed the survey 
and only 305 judges responded (response rate of 20.5%), however, it is quite possible that 
sample did not represent the larger population.  Attempts were made to make the sample as 
representative as possible by obtaining a national sample and encouraging response through 
multiple reminders and ease of accessing and participation in the survey.   This is also a problem 
that affects other research in this area, as the present participation rate was consistent with most 
previous research with this population (Redding & Repucci, 1999).    
Third, the vignette-based approach used in this study may have affected the results.  Most 
often, vignettes are, brief, time-limited, and easy for the participant to use.  However, the 
simplicity necessary for ease of use likely limits the amount of information that can be included 
while keeping the vignettes short.  The limited information and detail in the vignettes, as well as 
the inherent hypothetical nature of the vignettes, may have had an effect on the respondents’ 
ratings.  Information that judges generally obtain to make a decision about whether to transfer a 
juvenile to criminal court is guided by state statute.  In cases in which a judge is exercising 
judicial discretion, the information obtained is usually obviously more comprehensive than what 
could be provided in a study vignette.   
Fourth, the vignettes incorporated factors that were identified by research and scholarship 
as relevant to influences on judge’s decision to transfer.  However, these factors are by no means 
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an exhaustive list.  Specifically with regard to Kent criteria,
14
 there are other factors that can 
influence a judge’s decision to transfer.  The current study did not focus on sophistication-
maturity, for instance, but this may nevertheless be an important aspect of transfer decision-
making. 
Fifth, a web based survey was used in this study.  This type of survey medium is 
relatively novel.  There are some benefits to the web survey method.  Large and diverse samples 
can be accessed more easily through online survey than mail survey.  However, a potential 
problem exists for conducting online surveys when ―researchers lose control over the 
environment in which the research is conducted‖ (Kraut et al., 2004, p. 108) or ―contact the 
minimal number of potential subjects appropriate to their research goals‖ (p. 114).  Participants 
in the present study were selected from the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court 
Judges.  This was done in an effort to control the environment by soliciting participation from a 
                                                          
14
 (1)  The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection of the community 
requires waiver.  (2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or 
willful manner.  (3) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight being 
given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted.  (4)  The protective merit of the 
complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment 
(to be determined by consultation with the United States Attorney).  (5) The desirability of trial and disposition 
of the entire offense in one court when the juvenile’s associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be 
charged with a crime in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.  (6)  The sophistication and maturity 
of the Juvenile as determined by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and 
pattern of living.  (7)  The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts with the 
Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of 
probation to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile institutions.  (8)  The prospects for adequate 
protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have 
committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the 
Juvenile Court (Kent, 1966, p. 565-66). 
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select membership of United States judges, rather than sampling juvenile judges less 
systematically.  Limitations of online surveys are also affected by the acceptability of the internet 
as a method of data collection and representativeness of the sample.  Research has shown the 
internet ―remains unequally distributed throughout the U.S. population, … and it remains the 
responsibility of the researcher to ensure that all members of the defined population have equal 
access to the technology needed to complete the survey‖ (Granello & Wheaton, 2004, p. 389).  
The use of the internet as data medium could have systematically affected the sample; however, 
the target sample appeared to have had access to the internet and was comfortable using the 
internet, as they all had email address as a point of contact for the NCFJCJ.  Other difficulties 
with the internet survey involved the technical problems that were discussed previously, which 
were largely beyond the researcher’s control.   Unfortunately the technical problems encountered 
likely had a role in reducing the sample size of the current study.   
Lastly, the result from Levene’s Test for Equality of Variable shows that result was 
significant (p < .001), meaning that the assumption of equal variances has been violated.  
Therefore, the results of some of the analysis must be considered with caution.  (It should be 
added, however, that t-tests are robust to the violation of the assumption of homogeneity, so it is 
probably appropriate to conclude that the significance of the result was meaningful.)   It was 
clearly violated because of the small sample size in the one group and resulting unequal sample 
sizes.   This assumption was likely violated due to the small sample size in group 8 as well as the 
resulting unequal sample sizes across groups.  Two of the groups (7 and 8) were unintentionally 
routed via the online system to view group one’s vignette.  When the error was noticed, 
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investigators immediately attempted to correct the situation by re-surveying only the judges that 
had missing data (7and 8) with the permission of the NCFJCJ.  Unfortunately, even with the 
error being corrected, not enough judges responded a second time--which led to those groups 
being underrepresented.  This error most likely affected the outcome of the study. 
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Implications and Future Research 
 
The findings of the current study have clear implications for the social science, law, 
policy, and research.  These implications will be discussed in this final section. 
Using Forensic Evaluations in Transfer Decisions 
 
The present study found that forensic evaluations may not be being used when judges are 
deciding to transfer a juvenile to adult criminal court.  Judges were asked about the number of 
forensic evaluations they had read in the past year and over their careers.  The mean number of 
forensic evaluations they reported reading in the past year was 16 (SD=116.01); the median and 
mode were 0 and 0 respectively.  The mean number of evaluations that participating judges 
reported reading over their careers was 57 (SD=315.88) (median and mode were 2 and 0, 
respectively). This has serious implications for both the social science and legal community in 
highlighting the weight that has been given to forensic evaluations as a scientific tool to inform 
judges of a juvenile’s risk for reoffending and treatment amenability. This may indicate that 
judge’s are not aware of the psychologist’s potential role in helping to appraise risk and 
rehabilitative potential in juveniles.  Additionally, research should focus on whether the 
evaluations are being written and present in a way that are not helpful to the judge, and to 
investigate how to make evaluations more informative and useful for judicial transfer decisions--
considering the factors judges have rated as most influential on their transfer decisions. 
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Amenability to Treatment and Transfer Decisions 
 
Salekin, Yff, Neumann, Leistico, and Zalot (2002) noted that presently in the juvenile 
justice system, amenability to treatment is not consistently an explicit consideration in transfer 
decisions—but excluding this factor from such decisions is inconsistent with the rehabilitative 
philosophy of the juvenile justice system.  In the present study judges were asked if they 
believed juvenile courts should focus more on rehabilitation or retribution.  The vast majority of 
participants (77.7%, n = 237) reported their belief that the court should focus more on 
rehabilitation of juveniles, while .7% (n= 2) reported they believed the court should focus more 
on retribution.  There were some participants (21.6%, n=66) who declined to answer that 
question.  This response of rehabilitation being the ideal focus of the juvenile courts seems 
inconsistent in light of the value the judge’s placed on the amenability construct and it’s apparent 
insignificant influence on judge’s transfer decisions.  Perhaps judge’s may see the inherent value 
and necessity of rehabilitation being the court’s focus but for when having to weigh public safety 
viewed through the lens of risk, amenability to treatment has little influence on transfers.  
Essentially, it appears that rehabilitation may be important theoretically but risk (public safety) is 
more influential practically.  When judge’s have to make transfer decisions rehabilitation and 
retribution may in the judge’s minds be mutually exclusive concepts as opposed to being two 
values that can be considered and balanced on a case by case basis.  If one major purpose of the 
juvenile justice system is to rehabilitate delinquent youth, then all juveniles should be evaluated 
for amenability to treatment, and that factor should weigh heavily in the decision to transfer.  
Further research is needed to determine whether judges consider amenability as an influential 
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factor by itself (as suggested by some prior research), or whether they are inclined to consider it 
only when deciding on transfer in high risk cases (as the present study suggests).    Future 
research should also focus on uncovering the apparent discrepancy between how judge’s believe 
the juvenile court’s focus should be rehabilitation, yet report that amenability to treatment does 
not have a significant influence on their transfer decisions. Such additional research may help 
social science and legal scholars and practitioners more clearly define amenability to treatment, 
and improve upon the communication of current rehabilitative services to judges to better inform 
judges about the impact treatment can have on a youthful offender and how such treatment may 
reduce risk for reoffending.   
 
National Standards for Transfer Decisions  
 
 In Kent v. United States (1996), the Supreme Court highlighted the need to balance a 
juvenile’s welfare with the interest of the state.  That case created important and practical criteria 
to consider in weighing whether to transfer juveniles to criminal court.  Additionally, the court 
outlined a number as safeguards to protect the procedural integrity of a juvenile transfer, 
including having judges provide a statement articulating the specific reasons for the transfer 
(Allen, 2000).  As the present study suggests, treatment amenability may not be an important 
factor in isolation but depends on the level of risk in influencing judicial decision making.  An 
additional (non-Kent) factor also suggested by the present results is the nature of the weapon 
used.  We are recommending that social scientists, legislators and legal scholars develop easily-
understood definitions of the criteria for transfer that judges can use when making a decision, 
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develop a method for helping decision-makers more uniformly weigh those transfer constructs, 
and refine a method reflecting more standardization and less arbitrary decision making.  
Research is also needed to investigate to what degree judges are making transfer decisions based 
upon extra-legal and non-Kent factors such as then nature of the weapon used, and the impact 
those types of influences have on the fairness and number of transfers each year.   
 
Improvements in Delinquency Prevention and Weapon Reduction Interventions 
 Many studies have demonstrated that juvenile weapon carrying is associated with 
criminal and delinquent behaviors (Brown, 2009).  In order to reduce juvenile weapon carrying, 
an effort to reduce juvenile crime in general must be of paramount importance.  The literature 
suggests that the best way to address improving programs aimed at juvenile crime is through  
multi-component interventions involving coordinated efforts between local judicial officials, law 
enforcement, community members, parents, social services, and schools (Brown, 2009; Cullen 
2001).  When this type of effort has been used in the past to reduce juvenile crime, studies have 
shown that weapon offense arrests significantly dropped as well (Thomas et al., 2002).  Policies 
should also be designed to reduce weapon-associated juvenile violence.  The social science 
community can aid in this effort by developing evidenced-based practices and treatment 
programs aimed at identifying risk factors for juvenile delinquency and weapon-carrying, as well 
as creating more effective rehabilitative programs within our juvenile justice system. ` 
 
Despite the aforementioned limitations, this study focuses on the influences of the nature 
of weapon use in the commission of a crime in the context of judge’s juvenile transfer decisions.   
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To our knowledge, few studies have addressed judges’ decision-making in the context of 
juvenile transfer decisions, and none have examined the influence of the nature of the weapon 
used on a judge’s decisions to transfer a juvenile to adult criminal court.  Further, this study used 
an experimental design to observe the influence of risk, treatment amenability and nature of 
weapon on judges’ judicial transfer decisions.  Future research should attempt to broaden the 
external and content validity of the study through examination of genuine forensic evaluations 
for juvenile transfer cases.   
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Table 1 
State Transfer Provisions 
 
Transfer Mechanism 
Direct File Only 
States 
Nebraska 
Statutory Exclusion Only: New Mexico and New York 
Waiver
15
 Only Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode 
Island, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia  
Direct File and Statutory Exclusion Massachusetts 
Waiver and Direct File Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia, 
Michigan, Virginia, and Wyoming 
Waiver and Statutory Exclusion Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina 
All three mechanisms (Waiver, direct file, 
statutory exclusion) 
Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Montana, Oklahoma, and Vermont. 
Updated and adapted from the summary of the combination of transfer provisions (Griffin et al., 
1998, Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  
                                                          
15 Waiver refers to discretionary, mandatory, and/or presumptive judicial waivers.   
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Table 2 
Frequency of participants per vignette group 
Group  Frequency  Percent  
1  65  21.3  
2  24  7.9  
3  61  20.0  
4  26  8.5  
5  31  10.2  
6  73  23.9  
7  22  7.2 
8  3  1.0 
Total  305  100.0 
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Table 3  
Participants Gender and Racial/Ethnic Identity 
 N % 
Male 146 58.2 
Female 105 41.8 
White (non-
Hispanic) 
218 87.2 
African American 
(non-Hispanic) 
15 6.0 
Hispanic or Latino 9 3.6 
Asian American 3 1.0 
Native Hawaiian or 
other Pacific 
Islander 
1 .3 
Other 4 1.3 
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Table 4   
Participant’s age and experience with forensic evaluations and juvenile transfers 
 
Statistics 
 
Age 
Year 
earned law 
degree 
# of 
transfers in 
past yr 
# of 
transfers 
over career 
# of 
Forensic 
evals in 
career 
# of evals 
read this yr. 
N Valid 248 248 249 249 245 247 
Missing 57 57 56 56 60 58 
Mean 55.77 1981.44 17.90 67.03 56.75 15.54 
Median 56.00 1981.00 1.00 10.00 2.00 .00 
Mode 55 1980 0 0 0 0 
Std. Deviation 7.149 7.208 170.342 377.019 315.881 116.012 
Range 37 35 2500 5000 3500 1500 
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Table 5 
Participant’s Jurisdiction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State N 
Alabama 0 
Alaska 2 
Arizona 6 
Arkansas 5 
California 8 
Colorado 4 
Connecticut 1 
Delaware 5 
District of Columbia 0 
Florida 4 
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Georgia 19 
Hawaii 3 
Idaho 5 
Illinois 10 
Indiana 24 
Iowa 1 
Kansas 4 
Kentucky 9 
Louisiana 16 
Maine 0 
Maryland 2 
Massachusetts 1 
Michigan 1 
Minnesota 2 
Mississippi 0 
Missouri 2 
Montana 1 
Nebraska 5 
Nevada 7 
New Hampshire 8 
New Jersey 0 
New Mexico 1 
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New York  8 
North Carolina 1 
North Dakota 0 
Ohio 6 
Oklahoma 1 
Oregon 14 
Pennsylvania 7 
Rhode Island 2 
South Carolina 0 
South Dakota 0 
Tennessee 2 
Texas 19 
Utah 0 
Vermont 3 
Virginia 15 
Washington 2 
West Virginia 0 
Wisconsin 5 
Wyoming 2 
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Table 6 
Analysis of Variance for Judges’ Rated Likelihood to Transfer a Juvenile to Criminal Court 
  
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: Dependent variable of sample's likeliness to transfer 
Source Type III 
Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power
b
 
Corrected 
Model 
130.162
a
 6 21.694 18.016 .000 .296 108.097 1.000 
Intercept 391.067 1 391.067 324.774 .000 .558 324.774 1.000 
Riskforfuture 41.956 1 41.956 34.843 .000 .119 34.843 1.000 
Weapontype 13.564 1 13.564 11.265 .001 .042 11.265 .917 
Treatment 3.643 1 3.643 3.025 .083 .012 3.025 .410 
riskforfuture * 
weapontype * 
treatment 
.000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
weapontype * 
treatment 
.039 1 .039 .032 .857 .000 .032 .054 
riskforfuture * 
treatment 
16.646 1 16.646 13.825 .000 .051 13.825 .959 
riskforfuture * 
weapontype 
1.034 1 1.034 .859 .355 .003 .859 .152 
Error 309.459 257 1.204      
Total 2756.000 264       
Corrected Total 439.621 263       
a. R Squared = .296 (Adjusted R Squared = .280) 
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
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Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviations for Risk (High vs. Low) and Treatment Amenability (High vs. 
Low) Groups 
Dependent Variable: Dependent variable of sample's likeliness to transfer 
risk for future offending nature of weapon treatment amenability Mean Std. Deviation N 
dimension1 
High 
dimension2 
Knife 
dimension3 
High 2.22 .769 54 
Low 3.62 1.259 56 
Total 2.94 1.258 110 
Gun 
dimension3 
High 3.52 1.183 90 
Total 3.52 1.183 90 
Total 
dimension3 
High 3.03 1.220 144 
Low 3.62 1.259 56 
Total 3.20 1.256 200 
Low 
dimension2 
Knife 
dimension3 
High 1.95 .844 22 
Low 1.91 .900 23 
Total 1.93 .863 45 
Gun 
dimension3 
High 2.88 1.409 17 
Low 3.00 1.414 2 
Total 2.89 1.370 19 
Total 
dimension3 
High 2.36 1.203 39 
Low 2.00 .957 25 
Total 2.22 1.119 64 
Total 
dimension2 
Knife 
dimension3 
High 2.14 .795 76 
Low 3.13 1.399 79 
Total 2.65 1.242 155 
Gun 
dimension3 
High 3.42 1.237 107 
Low 3.00 1.414 2 
Total 3.41 1.234 109 
Total 
dimension3 
High 2.89 1.244 183 
Low 3.12 1.391 81 
Total 2.96 1.293 264 
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Table 8 
Summary of Independent Samples Test  
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. T Df 
Sig. 
(2-
taile
d) 
Mean 
Differen
ce 
Std. 
Error 
Differen
ce 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of 
the 
Difference 
Low
er 
Upp
er 
Dependent 
variable of 
sample's 
likeliness 
to transfer 
Equal 
varianc
es 
assume
d 
13.662 .000 -
17.98
3 
259 .000 -1.931 .107 -
2.14
2 
-
1.71
9 
Equal 
varianc
es not 
assume
d 
  
-
17.87
4 
240.3
99 
.000 -1.931 .108 -
2.14
4 
-
1.71
8 
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Figure 1  
Risk for Reoffending and Treatment Amenability Interaction 
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Figure 2 
Mean scores representing the probability of being transferred for Risk and Treatment 
Amenability Interaction 
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Appendix A 
Transfer Statutes States (14) with Judicial Discretion as their Sole Transfer Mechanism 
State and 
Statute 
Waiver Type Risk Assessment Treatment Needs and 
Amenability 
Nature of Weapon 
Hawaii 
HRS § 571-22 
(2004) 
Discretionary ―The safety of 
the community 
requires that the 
person be subject 
to judicial 
restraint for a 
period extending 
beyond the 
person's 
minority.‖ 
 
 
―The person is not 
treatable in any 
available institution or 
facility within the State 
designed for the care 
and treatment of 
children…‖  
None specified 
Kansas 
K.S.A. § 38-
1636 (2005) 
 
Discretionary 
and 
Presumptive 
“the protection 
of the 
community 
requires 
prosecution as an 
adult‖ 
“any other previous 
history of antisocial 
behavior or patterns of 
physical violence 
…[and]…whether 
there are facilities or 
programs available to 
the court which are 
likely to rehabilitate 
the respondent prior 
to the expiration of the 
court's jurisdiction 
under this code‖ 
None specified 
  JUVENILE TRANSFER 95 
 
Kentucky 
KRS § 
640.010 
(2004) 
 
Discretionary 
and 
Mandatory 
“The best 
interest of the 
child and 
community… 
The prospects of 
adequate 
protection of the 
public‖  
“The likelihood of 
reasonable 
rehabilitation of the 
child by the use of 
procedures, services, 
and facilities currently 
available to the 
juvenile justice 
system‖ 
Mandatory Waiver: 
A child of at least 14 
accused of a felony in 
which a firearm was 
used (whether 
functional or not) 
must be transferred to 
circuit court for trial 
as an adult  
Maine 
MRS 15, 
§3101 
(1997) 
Discretionary 
and 
Presumptive 
―Public safety: 
whether the 
protection of the 
community 
requires 
commitment of 
the juvenile for a 
period longer 
than the greatest 
commitment 
authorized; 
whether the 
protection of the 
community 
requires 
commitment of 
the juvenile to a 
facility that is 
more secure than 
any dispositional 
alternative‖ 
―Dispositional 
alternatives: whether 
future criminal 
conduct by the 
juvenile will be 
deterred by the 
dispositional 
alternatives available; 
whether the 
dispositional 
alternatives would 
diminish the gravity of 
the offense‖ 
None specified 
Missouri 
R.S.Mo.  § 
211.071 
 (2005) 
Discretionary ―… whether the 
protection of the 
community 
requires 
transfer to the 
―Whether the offense 
alleged is a part of a 
repetitive pattern of 
offenses which 
indicates that the child 
None specified 
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court of general 
jurisdiction‖ 
may be beyond 
rehabilitation under 
the juvenile code… 
Whether or not the 
child can benefit from 
the treatment or 
rehabilitative programs 
available to the 
juvenile court‖ 
New 
Hampshire 
RSA § 169-
B:24 (2005) 
Discretionary 
and 
Presumptive 
―prospects of 
adequate 
protection of the 
public …whether 
the protection of 
the community 
requires 
transfer…‖ 
―the likelihood of 
reasonable 
rehabilitation of the 
minor through the 
juvenile court system‖ 
None specified 
New Jersey 
N.J. Stat. § 
2A:4A-26 
(2005) 
Discretionary, 
Presumptive, 
and 
Mandatory 
None ―If the juvenile can 
show that the 
probability of his 
rehabilitation by the 
use of the procedures, 
services and facilities 
available to the court 
prior to the juvenile 
reaching the age of 19 
substantially outweighs 
the reasons for waiver, 
waiver shall not be 
granted‖ 
Presumptive Waiver: 
Minimum age 14-
Possession of a 
firearm with a 
purpose to use it 
unlawfully against the 
person of another, or 
any attempt or 
conspiracy to do so 
Mandatory Waiver: 
Minimum age  16- 
Possession of a 
firearm with a 
purpose to use it 
unlawfully against the 
person of another 
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North 
Carolina 
N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 7B-
2203  (2005) 
Discretionary 
and 
Mandatory 
―whether the 
protection of the 
public requires 
that the juvenile 
be prosecuted as 
an adult‖ 
 
―Prior attempts to 
rehabilitate the 
juvenile;…Facilities 
or programs available 
to the court prior to the 
expiration of the 
court’s jurisdiction 
under this Subchapter 
and the likelihood that 
the juvenile would 
benefit from treatment 
or rehabilitative 
efforts‖ 
 
 
None specified 
North 
Dakota 
N.D. Cent. 
Code, § 27-
20-34  (2005) 
 
 
Discretionary, 
Presumptive 
and 
Mandatory 
―The interests of 
the community 
require that the 
child be placed 
under legal 
restraint or 
discipline‖ 
―In determining a 
child’s amenability to 
treatment and 
rehabilitation, the court 
shall consider and 
make specific findings 
on the following 
factors: age,  mental 
capacity, maturity, 
degree of criminal 
sophistication 
exhibited, previous 
record success or 
failure of previous 
attempts to rehabilitate, 
whether the juvenile 
can be rehabilitated 
prior to expiration of 
juvenile court 
jurisdiction, any 
psychological, 
probation, or 
Presumptive Waiver: 
Minimum Age 14-
...escape involving 
the use of a 
dangerous weapon. 
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institutional reports, 
the nature and 
circumstances of the 
acts for which the 
transfer is sought the 
prospect for adequate 
protection of the 
public; and, any other 
relevant factors‖ 
 
Ohio 
ORC Ann. 
2152.12 
(2005) 
 
Discretionary 
and 
Mandatory 
―the safety of the 
community may 
require that the 
child be subject 
to adult 
sanctions‖ 
―The child is not 
amenable to care or 
rehabilitation within 
the juvenile system‖ 
Presumptive 
Minimum age- 16, 
Rape or aggravated 
robbery committed  
with a 
firearm…Aggravated 
arson or aggravated 
burglary, if 
committed with a 
firearm Minimum 
age 14/16-Voluntary 
or first degree 
involuntary 
manslaughter, if 
committed with a 
firearm 
Rhode Island 
R.I. Gen. 
Laws § 14-1-
7.2  (2005) 
Discretionary, 
Presumptive, 
Mandatory 
 
―Protection of 
the public, i.e., 
whether or not 
there are 
reasonable 
prospects for 
adequately 
protecting the 
―The jurisdiction of the 
court but for the 
exercise of 
certification is in all 
likelihood an 
insufficient period of 
time in which to 
accomplish a 
rehabilitation of the 
None specified 
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public by use of 
facilities 
currently 
available to the 
family court‖ 
 
child…Treatability of 
the child, i.e., whether 
or not there are 
reasonable prospects 
for rehabilitating the 
child by the use of 
facilities currently 
available to the family 
court in a private 
facility, in a 
community facility, or 
in a juvenile 
institution‖ 
Tennessee 
Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 37-1-
134  (2005) 
Discretionary ―The interests of 
the community 
require that the 
child be put 
under legal 
restraint or 
discipline‖ 
―The nature of past 
treatment efforts and 
the nature of the 
child’s response 
thereto… The possible 
rehabilitation of the 
child by use of 
procedures, services 
and facilities currently 
available to the court 
in this state‖ 
 
None specified 
Texas 
Tex. Fam. 
Code § 54.02 
 (2005) 
Discretionary ―the prospects of 
adequate 
protection of the 
public‖ 
― likelihood of the 
rehabilitation of the 
child by use of 
procedures,  services, 
and facilities currently 
available to the 
juvenile court‖ 
  
 
None specified  
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West 
Virginia 
W.Va Code § 
49-5-10 
(1996) 
Discretionary 
and 
Mandatory 
None specified None specified None specified 
Sources:  Presenter, Lyons, S., Heilbrun, K. (2008, March).  Deconstructing Treatment 
Amenability and Public Safety in Juvenile Decisions:  A National Survey of Relevant Statutes.  
NCJJ State Juvenile Justice Profiles:  
http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles/asp/transfer.asp?state=%2Fstateprofiles%2Fprofiles%2FWV06.
asp&topic=Transfer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  JUVENILE TRANSFER 101 
 
 
Appendix B 
Vignettes 
 
1. John is a 16 year old male who was arrested for armed robbery.  John was accused of 
entering a neighborhood convenience store and with a knife, demanding the cashier open 
the register and empty all of the money in a brown paper bag.  As part of this case, John’s 
public defender had a forensic clinician conduct an evaluation addressing violence risk 
and treatment needs/amenability.  The evaluator’s report concluded that John appeared to 
be a high risk for future offending and that John has treatment needs and amenability 
appropriate for rehabilitation in the juvenile system. 
 
2.  John is a 16 year old male who was arrested for robbery.  John was accused of entering a 
neighborhood convenience store with a knife demanding the cashier open the register and 
empty all of the money in a brown paper bag.  As part of this case, John’s public defender 
had a forensic clinician conduct an evaluation addressing violence risk and treatment 
needs/amenability.  The evaluator’s report concluded that John appeared to be low risk 
for future offending and said that John has treatment needs and amenability appropriate 
for rehabilitation in the juvenile system.  
 
3. John is a 16 year old male who was arrested for armed robbery.  John was accused of 
entering a neighborhood convenience store and with a knife demanding the cashier open 
the register and empty all of the money in a brown paper bag.  As part of this case, John’s 
public defender had a forensic clinician conduct an evaluation addressing violence risk 
and treatment needs/amenability.  The evaluator’s report concluded that John appeared to 
be high risk for future offending and said that John has treatment needs and amenability 
that were not appropriate for rehabilitation in the juvenile system. 
 
4. John is a 16 year old male who was arrested for armed robbery.  John was accused of 
entering a neighborhood convenience store and with a knife demanding the cashier open 
the register and empty all of the money in a brown paper bag.  As part of this case, John’s 
public defender had a forensic clinician conduct an evaluation addressing violence risk 
and treatment needs/amenability.  The evaluator’s report concluded that John appeared to 
be low risk for future offending and said that John has treatment needs and amenability 
that were not appropriate for rehabilitation in the juvenile system. 
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5. John is a 16 year old male who was arrested for armed robbery.  John was accused of 
entering a neighborhood convenience store and with a gun demanding the cashier open 
the register and empty all of the money in a brown paper bag.  As part of this case, John’s 
public defender had a forensic clinician conduct an evaluation addressing violence risk 
and treatment needs/amenability.  The evaluator’s report concluded that John appeared to 
be high risk for future offending and said that John has treatment needs and amenability 
appropriate for rehabilitation in the juvenile system.  
 
6. John is a 16 year old male who was arrested for armed robbery.  John was accused of 
entering a neighborhood convenience store and with a gun demanding the cashier open 
the register and empty all of the money in a brown paper bag.  As part of this case, John’s 
public defender had a forensic clinician conduct an evaluation addressing violence risk 
and treatment needs/amenability.  The evaluator’s report concluded that John appeared to 
be high risk for future offending and said that John has treatment needs and amenability 
that were not appropriate for rehabilitation in the juvenile system. 
 
7. John is a 16 year old male who was arrested for armed robbery.  John was accused of 
entering a neighborhood convenience store and with a gun demanding the cashier open 
the register and empty all of the money in a brown paper bag.  As part of this case, John’s 
public defender had a forensic clinician conduct an evaluation addressing violence risk 
and treatment needs/amenability.  The evaluator’s report concluded that John appeared to 
be low risk for future offending and said that John has treatment needs and amenability 
that were appropriate for rehabilitation in the juvenile system. 
 
8. John is a 16 year old male who was arrested for armed robbery.  John was accused of 
entering a neighborhood convenience store and with a gun demanding the cashier open 
the register and empty all of the money in a brown paper bag.  As part of this case, John’s 
public defender had a forensic clinician conduct an evaluation addressing violence risk 
and treatment needs/amenability.  The evaluator’s report concluded that John appeared to 
be low risk for future offending and said that John has treatment needs and amenability 
that were not appropriate for rehabilitation in the juvenile system. 
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Appendix C 
Vignette Survey Questions 
 
After each version of the Vignette, the following question will be asked.  When answering 
questions 1 and 2, assume that you are hearing a case before you on juvenile transfer.  I am 
interested in your response under the assumption that you have the requisite judicial discretion 
to transfer juveniles to adult criminal court, despite your state’s actual transfer mechanism(s).   
1. In this case, how likely are you to transfer the 16 year-old juvenile John to adult criminal 
court? (Please select one) 
1    2          3      4   5  
not at all likely       not likely        moderately likely   likely      highly likely   
  
 
2. After each five point rating question, the judges will be asked a forced answer question.  
Would you transfer the 16 year-old juvenile John to adult criminal court?  (Please select one) 
   
1     0  
 
Yes     No 
 
3. In what state do you currently serve as a Judge?   ______________________________ 
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Appendix D: 
Demographics and Transfer Survey 
 
1.  Your Gender: ___male ___female 
2. Your Race/Ethnicity: 
___African American (non-Hispanic) ___Hispanic or Latino 
___White (non-Hispanic)  ___ Asian-American 
___American Indian or Alaskan Native ___Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
___Other (please specify):____________ 
3. What age are you_____________ 
4. In what state do you serve on the bench? _____________________ 
5. In what year did you obtain your law degree?______ 
6. Please estimate how many judicial transfer decisions you have made in the past year.________ 
7.  Please estimate how many judicial transfer decisions you have made over your 
career._______ 
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8. Please estimate how many forensic psychological evaluations for transfer cases have you 
heard in your career.__________ 
9. How many forensic psychological evaluations for transfer have you read to guide a transfer 
decision in the past year?  __________ 
10. Are you familiar with your state’s legal requirements for juvenile transfer? 
  1   2 
  Yes   No 
11.What transfer mechanisms are available in your state to prosecute a juvenile in criminal 
court? 
1   2      3 
Judicial Transfer Prosecutorial Discretion/Direct File  Statutory Exclusion 
12. In your opinion, should juvenile courts focus more on retribution or rehabilitation for 
juvenile offenders? 
  1   2 
 Retribution   Rehabilitation 
13 In your opinion is the public more in favor or retribution or rehabilitation for juvenile 
offenders? 
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   1      2 
   Retribution     Rehabilitation 
14.  Do you believe that public safety will be enhanced in stricter gun laws are created and 
enforced? 
   1      2 
   Yes      No  
15.  In what type of location do you work? 
1   2   3 
Urban `  Suburban  Rural 
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Appendix E 
Email Communication to Juvenile Court Judges 
Dear Judge: 
I am a graduate student in the Law and Psychology Program at Drexel University and Villanova 
University School of Law.  As part of the requirement for my doctoral dissertation, I am 
conducting a research study.  The purpose of my study is to examine the influences on judicial 
decision making regarding the transfer of juveniles to criminal court.  I am gathering the opinion 
of juvenile and family court judges across the 50 states who use judicial discretion and other 
transfer mechanisms when making transfer/waiver decisions in their jurisdiction.   
This is an anonymous survey, and you will not be asked to report any identifying information.  
Results will be reported as summaries of data rather than individual responses. A summary of the 
findings will be posted to a website for your review after the successful defense of my 
dissertation.Completion of this survey will take no longer than 15 minutes.  Your participation is 
voluntary, and you may choose not to answer any or all questions.  No compensation is provided, 
but your information is very valuable to me and to the furtherance of the legal and social science 
community.  I would greatly appreciate your participation in this study.   
Clicking on the link will initiate your participation in the online survey.  At the start of the 
survey, you will be asked, ―What Group Are You In?‖  You are in group ____.  I thank you in 
advance for your support and participation.  By clicking on the link below, you are giving your 
electronic consent, and agreeing to participate in the study. 
http://(name of website for survey).com   
 
Sincerely,  
 
Sarita T. Lyons, J.D., M.S. 
Ph.D. Degree Candidate 
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